Unemployment and Gross Credit Flows in a New Keynesian Framework

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Abstract

The Great Recession of 2008-09 was characterized by high and prolonged unemployment and a lack of bank lending. In this paper, we account for the depth and persistence of unemployment during and after the crisis by considering the relationship between credit and firm hiring explicitly. We develop a New Keynesian model with nominal rigidities in wages and prices augmented by a banking sector characterized by search and matching frictions with endogenous credit destruction. In response to a financial shock, the model economy produces large and persistent increases in credit destruction, declines in credit creation, and an overall decline in reallocation of credit among banks and firms; total factor productivity declines and unemployment increases. Credit frictions not only amplify the effect of a financial shock by creating variation in the number of firms able to produce but they also increase the persistence of the shocks effects. These findings suggest that credit frictions combined with nominal rigidities are a plausible amplification mechanism for the impact of financial shocks and provide a mechanism for such shocks to have strong and persistent effects on the labor market.

JEL Codes: J64; E32; E44; E52

Keywords: Unemployment, financial crises, gross credit flows, productivity

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1 Introduction

The Great Recession and slow recovery was characterized domestically by a deep and prolonged decline in new job creation, an increase in financial volatility, and a decline in bank lending. The net decline in bank lending in all loan categories—including to consumers, to firms, and for real estate related reasons—was a novel feature of the Great Recession compared to previous post-Volker recessions, as was the large decline in job creation by small and medium sized firms. Most recessions, by contrast, are characterized by sharp increases in job destruction coupled with slow job creation primarily by large firms (see Foster, Grim, and Haltiwanger 2013). As a result, unemployment remained persistently high two years following the onset of the recovery and weak job creation among small and medium sized firms was an important factor.

We examine a potential mechanism for financial shocks to influence employment by incumbent firms and new entrants indirectly through their impact on bank lending, where lending occurs in a decentralized market. We model frictions in the loan market using a search and matching framework and include wage rigidities in the labor market and price rigidities in the market for final goods. We find that frictions in lending cause financial shocks to impact unemployment and productivity through a variety of mechanisms. First, lending frictions cause negative aggregate shocks to reduce the number of firms with profitable projects by altering the productivity cutoff for loan acquisition. Second, they impact the continuation probability for individual credit contracts. A decline in the continuation probability results in the severance of firm-bank relationships causing firms and banks to continue to search for credit partners or to shelve production, in the case of firms, or exit the market, in the case of banks. Third, aggregate shocks are amplified by credit frictions which directly affect aggregate productivity by causing the cutoff production probability determining the distribution of firms engaging in production to change. The main mechanism in this paper—the sorting of firms by a productivity cutoff generated through changes in the cost of finance—shares similarities with the one developed in Petrosky-Nadeau (2013).

The mechanisms highlighted in this paper are consistent with recent evidence from papers such as Iyer, Peydr, da Rocha-Lopes, and Schoar (2014), Boustanifar (2014), and Chodorow-Reich (2014), that use detailed bank-firm data, banking reforms, or carefully matched labor and credit data to consider linkages between financial shocks and bank lending or bank lending and employment. Iyer, Peydr, da Rocha-Lopes, and Schoar (2014) use Portuguese loan-level data to determine that financial shocks materially affected banks that relied more on interbank borrowing prior to the crisis. These banks reduced their lending by more than banks who did not rely as much on interbank borrowing. Firms in relationships with affected banks were unable to get access to the credit they needed. Thus providing evidence that financial shocks impacting credit availability within the banking sector have significant effects on firm borrowing. Boustanifar (2014) uses U.S. banking reforms to study the relationship between the availability of finance and employment. He exploits the time series variation in state deregulation of branch banking to determine that deregulation resulted in increased
employment growth at incumbent firms. He also finds evidence that easing of financing constraints had a direct effect on employment by financing the fixed costs of employment rather than indirectly affecting employment through an increase in investment and thereby the capital stock. Chodorow-Reich (2014) finds that, given the longevity of banking relationships and difficulty of forming new relationships, pre-crisis clients of banks that were more exposed to the financial crisis had a lower probability of receiving a loan and for those firms that did acquire a loan, the interest spread was higher. Chodorow-Reich (2014) also finds that this credit supply channel had differential effects depending on the size of the firm: small to medium sized firms exposed to banks in poor health experienced significant employment declines compared with larger firms. These heterogeneous effects by firm size are consistent with work by Adrian, Colla, and Shin (2012) who demonstrate that banking relationships may be less important for large firms with multiple sources of debt as well as equity finance.

Several recent papers, Craig and Haubrich (2013), Contessi and Francis (2013) and Herrera, Kolar, and Minetti (2014), provide empirical evidence on the patterns of credit reallocation across banks and over the business cycle as well as the specific properties of loan creation and destruction complimenting the statistical evidence on job flows. Herrera, Kolar, and Minetti (2014) and Contessi, DiCecio, and Francis (2015) also consider the reallocation of credit across firms. These papers look at gross lending and borrowing flows using a methodology developed in Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) more commonly employed for understanding job flows, thereby accounting for simultaneous increases and decreases in lending across banks. The combination of the credit and job flows literature provides significant evidence on the heterogeneous patterns of these flows at any phase in the business cycle and their relationship particularly during the Great Recession. We use the properties of credit flows determined in these papers to model bank-firm matches in order to understand how the destruction of such matches impacts employment, output, and productivity.

The literature linking credit availability to employment has become quite large. The important early contributions, such as Wasmer and Weil (2004) and den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2003), modeled decentralized credit markets using search and matching frictions to understand the propagation of aggregate shocks through financial intermediation to output, employment, and investment. den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2003) focus on an environment where lenders and entrepreneurs form long term relationships and where matched entrepreneurs decide over the effort they exert. This model also includes allocation frictions wherein funds may flow from households to lenders in an inefficient manner. More recent papers such as Becsi, Li, and Wang (2013) build detailed models of financial intermediation incorporating lending markets characterized by search-and-matching frictions as well as informational frictions. Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2013) adds search in lending markets to a labor search framework to understand how financial frictions can increase volatility in vacancies and unemployment a feature typically missing in labor search models without other sources of frictions.
Although we do not include search frictions in modeling the labor market, we induce volatility in unemployment while retaining relatively smooth real wages, by including wage rigidities in the form of Calvo staggered wage setting as described in Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000). We model unemployment similarly to Blanchard and Galí (2010), Galí (2011) and Galí, Smets, and Wouters (2012) as a reinterpretation of the labor market in the standard New Keynesian model. Each household member is indexed by the labor type she is specialized in and by a particular labor disutility index that her labor-type generates if she is employed. Therefore, labor is differentiated and each household member has market power to set its wage according to a Calvo pricing scheme. The existence of market power, wage rigidities and a participation condition for the marginal supplier of each labor type produces a gap between aggregate labor demand and the labor force. This gap is related to the difference between the prevailing aggregate real wage and the average disutility of labor expressed in terms of consumption and is positively related to the unemployment rate. Credit conditions affect the marginal cost of labor as well as aggregate labor demand by producing an extensive and intensive margin effect (discussed in detail below). The labor force is also affected by credit conditions via the aggregate marginal rate of substitution of the marginal supplier of labor. Thus credit conditions in this framework have direct and indirect effects on employment.

We model the lending market similarly to Becsi, Li, and Wang (2013) but without information frictions in order to focus on the propagation of financial shocks to labor markets. Our framework, unlike Becsi, Li, and Wang (2013), does not generate credit rationing.\textsuperscript{1} In our model, banks obtain funds by raising retail deposits in a competitive market. Firms must finance their wage bill via external funding which can be obtained through a match with an unmatched bank. Matched banks and firms decide whether to maintain or sever their relationship based on the firm’s idiosyncratic productivity draw. If the firm and the bank choose to cooperate, a loan contract is agreed on and Nash bargaining determines how the joint surplus of the match is shared. In equilibrium, there is a productivity threshold (reservation productivity) such that only those firms that are matched with a bank and that have a productivity level above this threshold are able to produce. Thus, equilibrium is characterized by a distribution of actively producing firms as well as a distribution of match-specific loan rates.

The search and matching friction in the loan market produces an endogenous inefficiency wedge that appears as an additional input in the aggregate production function. This inefficiency wedge depends on the aggregate probability of continuation for a loan contract as well as on the mass of active producing firms. Financial, and other aggregate, shocks impact the credit inefficiency gap directly, further amplifying the effect of the shock on aggregate labor productivity, employment, and output. Expansionary monetary policy shocks, for instance, increase the effects of the inefficiency wedge, thus generating an increased supply of credit, and increasing the number of firms and banks in productive credit relationships. An expansion in

\textsuperscript{1}In an appendix, we provide an extension where firms may abscond with their loans.
credit availability via a monetary policy shock, increases reallocation of credit across firms. Although credit
destruction declines after an expansionary shock, causing a decline in credit reallocation since firms maintain
their banking relationships, excess reallocation increases as more banks enter the market.

The bank’s opportunity cost of funds influences the level of economic activity at both the extensive and
intensive margins. A rise in the deposit rate increases the threshold level of the idiosyncratic productivity of
firms that generates a positive joint surplus. As a consequence, fewer firms are able to secure financing and
produce. This is the extensive margin effect. Conditional on producing, firms equate the marginal product
of labor to the Nash bargained marginal cost, so that an increase in the deposit rate, ceteris paribus, reduces
labor demand at each level of the real wage. This is the intensive margin effect. The Nash bargained marginal
cost of labor arises from solving the bilateral bargaining problem between a bank and a firm over the loan
rate and the loan size. The existence of a cost channel implies that loan size determines production scale for
all active firms while the search friction in the loan market implies that the relevant interest rate capturing
the cost channel is not the negotiated loan rate but the opportunity cost of funds that each bank faces.

The intensive and extensive margin channels work to reduce aggregate output as the deposit rate rises, and
symmetrically both channels increase output as the deposit rate falls. In addition, credit market conditions
reflected in the probability of a firm matching with a bank and the probability of a bank matching with a firm
directly affect the extensive margin; a rise in credit market tightness increases the reservation productivity and
fewer firms obtain credit. Both interest costs measured by the deposit rate and credit conditions measured
by credit market tightness matter for employment and output.

Our framework also exhibits a cost channel of monetary policy similar to Ravenna and Walsh (2006), in
which firms must finance wage payments in advance of production. The standard implication of the cost
channel is that the relevant cost of labor is affected by the interest rate firms pay on loans. However, when the
loan rate is the outcome of a bargaining process, as it is in our model, the role of the loan rate is to split the
surplus between the borrower (the firm) and the lender (the bank). In this context, the loan rate is irrelevant
for the firm’s employment decision which ultimately is a consequence of the conditions of the credit contract.
Although a cost channel arises, it depends on the opportunity cost of funds to the bank (determined by the
deposit rate), not the interest rate charged on the loan. Changes in monetary policy influence this opportunity
cost and affect the real marginal cost of production, employment, and the equilibrium spread between the
average rate on bank loans and the deposit interest rate. By the same token, the threshold productivity
level, below which the firm is unable to obtain financing, depends on monetary policy. By allowing for banks
to enter and exit the loan market as well as for active and inactive firms, monetary policy has effects on
employment and output on both the extensive and intensive margins. The latter arises since a reduction in
the cost of funds for banks makes it optimal for firms with access to credit to expand employment. The former
arises because the lower cost of finance will make it profitable for more firms produce. The impact of aggregate
shocks on the reservation or cut-off productivity, changes the productivity distribution of producing (active) firms and therefore total factor productivity and labor productivity in addition to changing the number of active firms, employment at those firms, and thereby output and aggregate employment.

We also consider the contribution of nominal frictions to this result. We find in general that nominal frictions exacerbate credit market frictions, increasing the response of lending, output, and total factor productivity to a financial shock though having only a small effect on the persistence of the shock’s effects. Following a negative financial shock, in the model with sticky prices and wages and credit frictions, the credit market tightens significantly, the number of firms search for financing increases, a steep decline in lending occurs and the average interest rate spread increases sharply. As a result, employment declines significantly, as does GDP. If we remove either of the nominal frictions (wage or price rigidities), the financial shock is much less severe and the effect on GDP and productivity is significantly weaker.

In the next section, we provide some motivating empirical evidence on the business cycle properties of gross credit and job flows as well as on the conditional response of gross credit flows and unemployment to a financial shock. We then develop a New Keynesian model with a decentralized lending market, price frictions in the final good sector, and wage frictions in the intermediate good sector. We focus on the responses of credit and labor markets to financial and monetary policy shocks. We specifically consider the mechanisms through which shocks affecting credit are propagated to the labor market and productivity. We then dissect the role of the various frictions—nominal and real—in producing the direction, amplitude, and persistence of the results and discuss our conclusions in the final section.

2 Empirical evidence on gross credit flows, unemployment and financial shocks

In this section we present some empirical regularities on the relationship between job flows and credit. We first discuss a set of unconditional moments and the business cycle properties of gross credit and job flows. Second, we look at the conditional responses of gross credit flows, inflation, employment, and unemployment to financial shocks within a recursively identified VAR. We use these empirical characteristics to motivate the model we develop subsequently.

2.1 Cyclical properties of gross credit and job flows

Although we primarily consider net job flows in this paper by focusing on employment and unemployment, the data on gross job flows provides insight into the factors driving unemployment and the relationship between credit flows and unemployment. We use quarterly data on manufacturing job flows from Faberman (2012) updated with data from the Business Economic Dynamics (BED) database. We also use quarterly data on job
flows in all non-governmental sectors from the BED. For credit flows, we use a measure of credit availability derived from information in the Reports of Income and Condition. The Reports of Income and Condition, known as the Call Reports, must be filed each quarter by every bank and savings institution overseen by the Federal Reserve (i.e., those who hold a charter with the Federal Reserve). These reports contain a variety of information from banks’ income statements and balance sheets. We use quarterly reported total loans and lending to commercial and industrial enterprises to create measures of credit creation and destruction. Quarterly Call Report data is available beginning in 1979Q1. We use an additional 24 quarters of historical data collected and organized in Craig and Haubrich (2013). Lending data is then linked to data from the National Information Center (NIC) on mergers and acquisitions during this period. Using the M&A data from the NIC we can remove bias that might arise from counting lending activity at both the acquired and acquiring bank (See Contessi and Francis 2013 for a full discussion of how these data are compiled). We then remove from the data seven investment banks and credit card companies that acquired commercial bank charters during the 2008-09 recession and financial crisis.

In order to determine ‘gross credit flows’ we use a technique first adapted from the labor literature in Dell’Ariccia and Garibaldi (2005) for credit flows. Define $l_{i,t}$ as total loans for bank $i$ in quarter $t$. Let $g_{i,t}$ be the credit growth rate for bank $i$ between $t$ and $t-1$, adjusted for mergers or acquisitions. Then we can define:

$$PO_{i,t} = \sum_{i \mid g_{i,t} \geq 0} \alpha_{i,t} g_{i,t}$$

$$NE_{i,t} = \sum_{i \mid g_{i,t} < 0} \alpha_{i,t} |g_{i,t}|$$

where

$$\alpha_{i,t} = \left( \frac{0.5(l_{i,t} + l_{i,t-1})}{\sum_{i=1}^{N} l_{i,t-1}} \right)$$

and $\frac{1}{2}(l_{i,t} + l_{i,t-1})$ is a measure of the average loan portfolio size of bank $i$ between period $t$ and $t-1$ and where $\sum_{i=1}^{N} l_{i,t-1}$ is the loan portfolio of the banking system in the previous period.

Given these measures of credit creation (POS) and credit destruction (NEG), we can define net lending as $NET = POS - NEG$. We use a similar accounting measure for gross job flows using data directly from the BED (1992Q2-2012Q4) and Faberman (2012) (for 1973Q1-1991:Q4).

Table (5) in Appendix A provides the means and standard deviations of lending and job flow variables for our entire sample (1973Q1 to 2012Q4) and three sub-periods—the Great Moderation, 1984Q1 to 2007Q2;
the Great Recession, 2007Q3 to 2009Q2; and the post Recession period, 2009Q3 to 2012Q4. Three features of these summary statistics are notable. First, the mean of loan creation plus loan destruction (SUM) is significantly larger during the Great Recession than during other reported sub-periods. This feature is driven by an increase in loan destruction. The sum of loan creation and destruction is a measure of ‘churning’ or reallocation in the banking sector. Increases in reallocation (SUM) can come from expansion in credit availability or from an increase in credit destruction. Each of these possibilities has different implications for reallocation. Simultaneously high credit creation and destruction produces significant reallocation even though high credit destruction implies more credit search or firm exit. But given credit availability, search for new contracts should be quicker. High creation and low destruction, ceterus paribus, implies less reallocation and less search. Second, the mean value for net loan creation during each subperiod is positive indicating credit growth in each period including the Great Recession. Net loan creation however is very small during the post Great Recession period due to very weak loan creation. Third, excess loan creation (the difference between the SUM and the absolute value of the NET) is the largest during the Great Moderation. Excess loan creation (EXC) measures credit reallocation in excess of what is required to accommodate a change in net credit. For example, if credit creation equals one and credit destruction equals zero, then SUM equals one as does NET, thus EXC equals zero meaning no additional reallocation of credit between firms occurred when credit creation increased. Reallocation of credit–provided it is reallocated in a productivity enhancing manner–can have positive impacts on output and employment.

We find that mean job creation is higher during the Great Moderation than any other sub-period, while job destruction is higher during the Great Recession than other sub-periods. Interestingly, the mean of net job creation is negative during both the Great Moderation and the Great Recession though it is significantly more negative during the Great Recession. (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992) note that typically job destruction is high during recessions while job creation is less responsive causing recessions to be episodes of increased reallocation which in some cases can be productivity enhancing. During the great recession, job reallocation was much lower than usual because job creation declined significantly. The decline in reallocation likely exacerbated the decline in output through its impact on productivity (see Foster, Grim, and Haltiwanger 2013).

In general, we find loan flows are more volatile than job flows but both are more volatile than either GDP or unemployment. We also find that volatilities of loan and job flows rise during the Great Recession and fall afterwards.

In Table (6) in Appendix A we provide relative standard deviations of bank lending flows (total loan creation and destruction) and job flows (job creation and job destruction) as well as their correlation with the cyclical component of either real GDP or the unemployment rate for our entire sample period (1973Q1

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2In this paper we have focused on the behavior of credit and job flows during and following the Great Recession. Please see Contessi, DiCecio, and Francis (2015) for more detailed statistics and analysis of credit flows in general.
to 2012Q4) and three sub-periods (detailed above). We use the HP-filtered log-level of each variable in
determining their relative standard deviations and correlations.

We find that loan creation and destruction are much more volatile than real GDP and that the relative
volatility of loan destruction increased significantly in the post Great Recession period. Job creation and
job destruction are much less volatile than unemployment aside from during the Great Recession when job
destruction was more volatile.

In terms of correlations, we find that the cyclical component of loan creation is positively correlated
with real GDP in all periods (top panel of table 6), though the correlation is only statistically significant
during the post-recession period. Loan creation is acyclic during the Great Moderation. Loan destruction, as
expected, is (significantly) counter-cyclical, though the counter-cyclicality is primarily driven by the Great
Recession and post Great Recession period when it is strongly counter-cyclical. The sum of loan creation
and destruction, a measure of general loan turnover, is acyclic and not significant.\footnote{For a full account of credit flow cyclicality please see Contessi, DiCecio, and Francis 2015.}

Job creation is strongly negatively correlated with unemployment (bottom panel of table 6) during the
Great Recession as expected, but strongly positively correlated post recession. This last unusual result could
be due to the fact that unemployment did not begin a consistent decline until 2010Q4 despite the fact that job
creation began to increase, relatively smoothly beginning in 2009Q2. Job destruction is positively correlated
with unemployment during our entire sample and throughout each subsample, though it is most strongly
correlated during the Great Recession. The sum of job creation and job destruction, a measure of labor
market churn, is positively correlated with unemployment throughout the sample and sub-samples. The
pro-cyclicality of labor market reallocation is strongest during the Great Recession.

Typically during recessions, credit creation slows and credit destruction sharply rises, particularly for
commercial lending. Figure 1 displays quarterly net credit flows (credit creation less credit destruction) of
commercial and industrial lending following the trough of the last four recessions. The trough of the recession
is dated using NBER dates and depicted as zero; movement in net credit following the trough is graphed
for eight quarters. We also graph the average of the past four recessions which is strongly influenced by
with net credit continuing to contract even as GDP and other indicators rise. Net credit flows rebounded
much faster following the recession in 1981 and display a distinctly different pattern. The three more recent
recessions follow the same pattern although the 2007-09 recession has the largest and most prolonged decline
in credit. Figure 2 considers each credit flow separately. The top row depicts credit creation (left graph)
and credit destruction (right graph). We find that during the Great Recession, credit creation continued
to fall after the NBER dated trough (at zero, where credit creation is set to its mean of 3 percent during
all four recessions) which is unlike any of the previous four recessions though its recovery looked similar to
the post-1990 recession recovery. Credit destruction, similarly, was significantly larger in the first quarter following the trough of the 2007-09 recession and in that sense much different than any of the three previous recessions. In the bottom row, the left graph shows a measure of credit reallocation which is the sum of credit creation and destruction. The movements in reallocation for the 2007-09 recessions looked somewhat similar to the 1990 and 2001 recessions initially, but then displayed a long and persistent decrease. The right graph in the bottom row provides another measure of credit reallocation—excess reallocation—which is the sum of creation and destruction less the net. Excess reallocation declined significantly through the trough of the 2007-09 recession and then recovered after approximately three quarters. (Contessi, DiCecio, and Francis, 2015) note that excess reallocation tends to rise during recessions although the Great Recession was an exception. Foster, Grim, and Haltiwanger (2013) find evidence that input and output reallocation across producers declined during the Great Recession. They suggest that credit markets distortions, which are amplified during financial crises, can cause reallocation to be determined more by credit constraints than by productivity and other considerations. In these cases, reallocation may not be productivity enhancing depending on the allocation of credit and distribution of productivity.

Note that the reallocation of credit we focus on is reallocation across banks not between firms. This type of reallocation occurs because a bank changes the amount it lends or because a bank enters or exits the lending market. It is linked to liquidity in the lending market and the ability of firms to access credit. Ultimately, given our focus on labor market outcomes, inter-firm credit reallocation is more relevant than inter-bank reallocation. Although reallocation of credit across banks does not strictly translate into the reallocation of credit across firms, if we focus on smaller firms, for whom bank credit is a significant portion of their financing, these firms are typically reliant on their relationship with a given bank, Petersen and Rajan (1994). In this sense, credit reallocation across banks can provide some evidence for reallocation across firms. Herrera, Kolar, and Minetti (2014) and Contessi, DiCecio, and Francis (2015) provide detailed and important information about credit reallocation across firms as well as across banks and discuss the mechanisms by which inter-firm reallocation impact aggregate outcomes at business cycle frequencies.

Net job flows typically demonstrate a pro-cyclical pattern where job creation slows during recessions and job destruction typically rises. During the Great Recession, job destruction increased by much more than during previous recessions (percentage wise) and was a much larger contributor to the increase in unemployment than during previous recessions. The job creation rate was also depressed for much longer than usual, which reduced the post-recession job finding rate more significantly than in previous recessions. Figure 3 considers net job creation in manufacturing following the trough of the last four recessions. It is clear from the figure, that net job growth following the trough of the Great Recession displays a similar pattern to past recessions particularly compared with the 2001 recession. But since the decline in net creation was significantly larger, there was much more recovery required. At the trough, unemployment was still rising
and full recovery in net job creation to pre-recession levels did not occur until approximately four quarters after the NBER dated the trough of the 2007-09 recession.\footnote{Fort, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2013) investigate worker and job flow patterns across firms of different sizes and ages and find that job flow patterns exhibit significant heterogeneity across firm size and age. In this paper, we ignore differential patterns of job flows across firms to focus on aggregate employment and unemployment.}

Figure 4 provides measures of a set of aggregate variables for the last four recessions: total factor productivity, average labor productivity, real GDP, and the unemployment rate. TFP is shown in percentage change terms, while the log of average labour productivity is smoothed using a Baxter King filter, and log real GDP is detrended. From this data, we see that total factor and labor productivity initially recovered strongly following the trough of the Great Recession but declined following the initial recovery (in a pattern that is reflected by previous recessions as well), while real GDP remained below trend and the unemployment rate, which increased to near historic rates, returned to its pre-Recession level.

### 2.2 A Simple VAR

In this section, we investigate the relationship among credit flows and macro-aggregates using a simple vector auto-regression framework.

We use the following standard representation of a reduced form VAR:

\[
Z_t = A(L)Z_{t-1} + v_t
\]

where \( A(L) = A_1 + A_2 L + \ldots + A_p L^p, p < \infty \). \( v_t \) are the reduced form residuals which are related to the structural shocks \( \epsilon_t \) via the structural matrix \( A_0 \), where \( \epsilon_t = A_0 v_t \), and with variance covariance matrix \( E[v_t v'_t] = V \). We identify our two shocks of interest, monetary policy and financial, by contemporaneous restrictions. As in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) variables ordered before the Federal Funds rate in the VAR do not respond contemporaneously to monetary policy shocks. Similarly, using the same identification as Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012), variables ordered before the financial shock do not respond contemporaneously to financial shocks.

The data used in our analysis is the following:

\[
Z_t = \left[ \Delta \ln \frac{Y_t}{N_t}, \Delta \ln N_t, U_t, \pi_t, EBP_t, i_t, GCF_t \right]
\]

The variables included are the growth rate of labor productivity \( \Delta \ln \frac{Y}{N} \), the growth rate of employment \( \Delta \ln N_t \), the unemployment rate \( U_t \), the GDP deflator as a measure of inflation \( \pi_t \), the excess bond premium \( EBP_t \), the Federal Funds rate, \( i_t \) as the measure of the monetary policy stance and a pair of gross credit flows rates (credit creation and credit destruction) denoted by \( GCF_t = [POS_t, NEG_t] \). Each data series is seasonally adjusted using the X-12 ARIMA procedure.
We have not explicitly taken into consideration quantitative easing enacted by the Federal Reserve, therefore our measure of the monetary policy stance under-represents the looseness of monetary policy.\footnote{Since monetary policy at the zero lower bound is not the focus of this paper, we have not used various measures of the ‘shadow’ Federal Funds rate; see for example, Krippner (2013) among others}

The excess bond premium (EBP), sometimes referred to as the ‘GZ credit spread’ is taken from Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012). It is constructed from the credit spread of U.S. non-financial corporate bonds over Treasury bills and decomposed into two parts. The first is a component that captures systematic movements in the default risk of individual firms measured using Merton (1974)’s distance to default model. The second is a residual component, the excess bond premium, which is the variation in the average price of bearing exposure to U.S. corporate credit risk that is not otherwise compensated for by the expected default premium. The EBP has been used in many recent papers as a measure of financial risk (for example, Boivin, Kiley, and Mishkin 2010 and Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno 2013). It is a good measure of unanticipated changes in financial markets.

As noted above, the VAR is identified using a recursive ordering such that the last ordered variable responds contemporaneously to all shocks. Given this framework, we need at least 28 restrictions and with the short run restrictions, our model is exactly identified.

Figures 5 and 6 in appendix A present the impulse responses to an increase in the excess bond premium (EBP) as the financial shock. The first figure in this series (figure 5) shows the responses of labor productivity, employment, unemployment and inflation to a one standard deviation increase in the EBP. The responses are consistent with those described in Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012). Employment and unemployment as well as inflation respond sluggishly—and persistently—to the shock, with unemployment peaking at roughly 6 quarters post shock and returning to baseline within 12 to 14 quarters. The next figure, figure 6, depicts the response of credit. There are two notable features of this panel of impulse responses. First, the initial response of credit creation to a financial shock, is to increase. Note that due to the ordering of the VAR, credit flows can respond contemporaneously to financial and monetary shocks. The increase in credit creation is likely due to firms’ and consumers’ draw down of credit commitments, such as lines of credit, which creates an initial increase in lending even though few new loans are actually extended. Credit destruction initially falls as well but the drop is not statistically significant. This surprising decline in credit destruction initially is also possibly driven by firms’ and consumers’ use of credit lines. After the initial impact, credit creation declines quickly and credit destruction rises. Credit creation reaches a trough after approximately four quarters, rising slowly over the next ten quarters to return to baseline. A full recovery in lending activity is not observed for three to four years following a financial shock. Similarly, credit destruction rates peak at approximately four quarters but slowly return to baseline after approximately ten quarters.
3 The model economy

The model economy is populated by households, banks, firms, and a central bank. The representative household is composed of a continuum of members that supply differentiated labor to firms, hold cash and bank deposits, and purchase final output in the goods market. Firms seek financing, hire labor financed by bank loans and produce output. Banks accept deposits, sometimes hold reserves with the central bank and finance the wage bill of firms. The central bank pays interest on reserve deposits for those banks unable to extend a loan in a given period.

Three aspects of the model are of critical importance. First, it is assumed households cannot lend directly to firms. While this type of market segmentation is taken as exogenous, it could be easily motivated by assuming informational asymmetries under which households do not have access to technology to monitor firms while banks do. This asymmetry also forces firms to make up-front payments to workers to secure labor. Second, lending activity involving firms and banks occurs in a decentralized market characterized by random matching. Third, we assume all payment flows must be settled at the end of each period.

At the beginning of each period, aggregate shocks are realized and households deposit funds with a bank. The market for deposits is competitive. In the lending market, firms seek funding to make wage payments. Firms are subject to aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity shocks and these determine whether it is profitable for a firm to operate and, if it is, at what scale. If a firm is not already matched with a bank, it must seek out a new lender. Similarly, banks not already matched with a firm must search for borrowers. After the loan market closes, firms and workers produce and households consume, while unmatched banks deposit their funds with the central bank and receive an interest rate matching the interest rate on deposits. After markets close all net payment flows are settled. Therefore loans are not risky and there is no possibility of default. At the end of the period, banks receive repayment from firms and the bank transfers all its profits (positive or negative) to the representative household.

3.1 Households

Each household has a continuum of members. Following Galí (2011), each household member is represented by the unit square and indexed by \((i, j) \in [0, 1]^2\). Where \(i\) denotes the type of labor service in which a given household member is specialized and \(j\) determines the dis-utility from work for each household member. The dis-utility from work is given by \(\chi_{t,j}\) if employed and zero otherwise with \(\chi_t\) being an exogenous preference shifter. As is standard in the unemployment literature, we assume full risk sharing of consumption among household members (see for example, Andolfatto 1996). Utility from consumption is separable and logarithmic in a CES index of the quantities consumed of the different goods available. Given separability of preferences between consumption and dis-utility from work, full risk sharing implies \(C_t(i, j) = C_t \quad \forall i, j\), where \(C_t(i, j)\)

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6 Banks hold reserves with the central bank when they cannot find a project to fund. The process is explained below.
is the consumption for a household member specialized in labor type $i$ and having dis-utility of work $\chi_{ij}\bar{\eta}$.

Each household member has the following period utility function: $U(C_t, j) = \log C_t - 1_t(i, j)\chi_{ij}\bar{\eta}$, where $1_t(i, j)$ is an indicator function taking the value of one if the corresponding household member is employed and zero otherwise. Aggregating across all household members yields the household period utility function denoted by $U(C_t, N_t(i), \chi_t)$ and given by:

$$U(C_t, N_t(i), \chi_t) = \log C_t - \chi_t \int_0^1 \frac{N_t(i)^{\bar{\eta}+1}}{1 + \bar{\eta}} \, di$$

(2)

where $N_t(i)$ is the fraction of household members specialized in labor type $i$ who are employed during the period. In other words, $N_t(i)$ is the employment rate or aggregate demand during period $t$ among workers specialized in labor type $i$. Aggregate household consumption is given by the standard CES aggregator:

$$C_t = \left( \int_0^1 C_t(j)^{\bar{\eta} / \bar{\eta} - 1} \, dj \right)^{\bar{\eta} / \bar{\eta} - 1}$$

(3)

Optimization over consumption by households implies the following demand schedule for each differentiated good $j$, $C_t(j) = \left( \frac{P_t(j)}{P_t} \right)^{-\bar{\eta} / \bar{\eta} - 1} C_t$ such that $\int_0^1 P_t(j) C_t(j) \, dj = P_t C_t$, where $P_t$ is the final goods price index (i.e, the retail price index) and is determined as $P_t = \left( \int_0^1 P_t(j)^{1-\bar{\eta}} \, dj \right)^{1 / \bar{\eta}}$.

**The household problem**

We assume the household enters the period with money holdings given by $M_{t-1}$ and deposits a fraction of its money holdings, denoted by $D_t$, in the bank. Each household receives a nominal lump-sum transfer $T_t$ from the government. Employed household members are paid their labor income in advance. The household uses its labor income and money holdings, net of deposits, to buy a continuum of final goods subject to the CIA constraint and the sequence of budget constraints. The representative household is assumed to maximize:

$$E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left\{ \log C_t - \chi_t \int_0^1 \frac{N_t(i)^{\bar{\eta}+1}}{1 + \bar{\eta}} \, di \right\}$$

(4)

subject to the following cash in advance constraint:

$$P_t C_t \leq M_{t-1} + T_t - D_t + \int_0^1 W_t(i) N_t(i) \, di$$

(5)
and end of period money holdings given by:

$$M_t = (1 + i_t) D_t + T_t + \Pi^b_t + \Pi^I_t + \Pi^f_t + M_{t-1} - D_t + \int_0^1 W_t (i) N_t (i) \, di - P_t C_t$$

(6)

where \(i_t\) is the nominal net interest rate on deposits, \(\Pi^b_t, \Pi^I_t,\) and \(\Pi^f_t\) are nominal profits transferred respectively by banks, intermediate and final good producers. When choosing \(C_t\), the household takes as given the distribution of wages \(\{W_t (i)\}_{\forall i}\) as well as employed household members for each labor type \(\{N_t (i)\}_{\forall i}\). The household optimality condition with respect to consumption is then given by the standard Euler equation

$$\frac{1}{C_t} = \beta E_t \left\{ \left( \frac{1 + i_t}{1 + \pi_{t+1}} \right) \frac{1}{C_{t+1}} \right\}$$

(7)

where \(\pi_t = \frac{P_t - P_{t-1}}{P_{t-1}}\) is the net inflation rate. In this case, the marginal utility of consumption is equal to:

$$\frac{1}{C_t} = \lambda_t + \mu_t$$

where \(\lambda_t\) and \(\mu_t\) are the multipliers associated with the budget constraint and the CIA constraint respectively. The stochastic discount factor is distorted by the nominal interest rate and it is given by

$$\Delta_{t,t+1} = \beta \left( \frac{1 + i_t}{1 + \pi_{t+1}} \frac{C_t}{C_{t+1}} \right).$$

**Wage setting** Workers specialized in a given type of labor, reset their nominal wage with probability \(1 - \theta_w\) each period. Following (Erceg, Henderson, and Levin, 2000), when re-optimizing wages during period \(t\), workers choose a wage \(W^*_t\) in order to maximize household utility taking as given all aggregate variables. Household workers of type \(i\) face a sequence of labor demand schedules of the form:

$$N_t (i) = \left( \frac{W_t (i)}{W_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon_w} \int_{z}^\infty N_t (\omega_z) \, dz$$

where \(W_t\) denotes the aggregate wage index given by

$$W_t = \left( \int_0^1 W_t (i) \, di \right)^{-\varepsilon_w}$$

and \(\int_{z} N_t (\omega_z) \, dz\) denotes aggregate labor demand across all active intermediate good producers indexed by \(z\).

The wage setting optimization problem for the household workers specialized in labor type \(i\) is specified as

$$\max \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\beta \theta_w)^k \left\{ \log C_{t+k} - \chi_{t+k} \int_{0}^{1} \frac{N_t (\omega_{t+k|t})}{1 + \varphi} \, d\zeta \right\}$$

(8)

subject to

$$N_{t+k|t} = \left( \frac{W^*_t}{W_{t+k}} \right)^{-\varepsilon_w} \int_{z} N_{t+k} (z) \, dz$$

(9)

and the CIA and budget constraints. The first-order condition associated to the wage setting problem is given by

$$E_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\beta \theta_w)^k \left\{ \left( \frac{W^*_t}{P_{t+k}} - \frac{\varphi}{(\varepsilon_w - 1) MRS_{t+k|t}} \right) \left( \frac{N_{t+k|t}}{C_{t+k}} \right) \right\} = 0$$

(10)

Notice that \(N_{t+k|t}\) denotes the quantity demanded in period \(t + k\) of a labor type whose wage was last reset in period \(t\).
where $MRS_{t+k|t}$ denotes the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and employment for a type $i$ worker whose wage is reset during period $t$, given by $MRS_{t+k|t} = C_{t+k} \chi_{t+k} (N_{t+k|t})$. Note that the productivity distribution of producing firms will influence the wage setting equation and therefore the real wage. Under Calvo wage setting, the evolution of the aggregate real wage index, $w_t$, satisfies the following equation:

$$w_{t}^{1-\epsilon_w} = \theta_w \left( w_{t-1} \frac{1}{\Pi_t} \right)^{1-\epsilon_w} + (1 - \theta_w) (w^*_t)^{1-\epsilon_w}$$

(11)

The recursive formulation of the wage setting optimality condition, expressed in terms of the average real wage of the economy, $\bar{w}_t$, is given by the following set of three equations:

$$f_{1,t} = \left( \frac{\epsilon_w}{\epsilon_w - 1} \right) f_{2,t}$$

(12)

$$f_{1,t} = (w^*_t)^{1-\epsilon_w} \left( w_t \right)^{\epsilon_w} \frac{N_t}{C_t \Delta_t^W} + \beta \theta_w E_t \left( \frac{1}{\Pi_{t+1}} \right)^{1-\epsilon_w} \left( \frac{w_t}{w_{t+1}} \right)^{1-\epsilon_w} f_{1,t+1}$$

(13)

$$f_{2,t} = \chi_t \left( \frac{w^*_t}{w_t} \right)^{\epsilon_w (1+\tau)} \left( \frac{N_t}{\Delta_t^W} \right)^{(1+\tau)} + \beta \theta_w E_t \left( \frac{1}{\Pi_{t+1}} \right)^{-\epsilon_w (1+\tau)} \left( \frac{w_t}{w_{t+1}} \right)^{-\epsilon_w (1+\tau)} f_{2,t+1}$$

(14)

where $w^*_t$ is the optimal real wage, $\Pi_t = 1 + \pi_t$ is the gross inflation rate, $f_{1,t}$ and $f_{2,t}$ are auxiliary variables and $\Delta_t^W$ is the wage dispersion index given by $\Delta_t^W = \int_0^1 \left( \frac{w_t(j)}{w_t} \right)^{-\epsilon_w} dj$ which can be written recursively as:

$$\Delta_t^W = \theta_w \left( \frac{w_{t-1}}{w_t} \right)^{-\epsilon_w} \Delta_{t-1}^W + (1 - \theta_w) \left( \frac{w_t}{w_{t+1}} \right)^{-\epsilon_w} \Delta_{t+1}^W \left( \frac{w_t}{w_{t+1}} \right)^{-\epsilon_w}$$

(15)

Unemployment dynamics

Following Galí (2011), we use household welfare as the maximizing criterion, rather than individual utility, and take as given current aggregate labor market conditions. The worker indexed by $(i,j)$ is then willing to work in period $t$ if and only if the real wage is greater than or equal to the disutility of labor, $\chi_t \sqrt{\tau}$, relative to the marginal value of income, $\lambda_t = \frac{1}{(1+i_t)C_t}$, that is:

$$\frac{W_t(i)}{P_t} \geq \frac{\chi_t \sqrt{\tau}}{\lambda_t} = (1 + i_t)C_t \chi_t \sqrt{\tau}$$

(16)

Let $L_t(i)$ be the marginal supplier of type $i$ labor. The marginal supplier of type $i$ labor satisfies the above equation with equality, since she is indifferent between working or not working. The labor force or aggregate participation condition is obtained by integrating over all the marginal suppliers, $L_t = \int_0^1 L_t(i) di$. Then, the aggregate supply of labor is defined by
\[ w_t = (1 + i_t) C_t \chi_t (L_t)^ζ \]  

where \( w_t \) denotes the average real wage of the economy. In the presence of wage rigidities, labor force dynamics are mostly driven by wealth effects, that is, by the inverse of the marginal value of income. The CIA constraint implies that the gross nominal interest rate acts as a consumption tax, affecting the marginal utility of consumption. Therefore, changes in \( C_t \) and \( i_t \) induce shifts in the labor supply.

The unemployment rate is defined as

\[ U_t = 1 - \frac{N_t}{L_t} \]  \hspace{1cm} (18)

with \( N_t \) being aggregate employment which corresponds to the following index:

\[ N_t = \int_0^1 \int N_t (i, \omega_z, t) \, di \, dz \]  \hspace{1cm} (19)

where as explained below, \( N_t (i, \omega_z, t) \) is the demand for labor type \( i \) by the intermediate producer \( z \), who is characterized by idiosyncratic productivity \( \omega_z, t \).

### 3.2 Firms

The production side of the model is characterized by a two-sector structure that distinguishes between intermediate and final good producers as in Walsh (2005). Firms in the intermediate good sector must have a credit relationship with a bank before production can occur. Only the subset of intermediate good producers obtaining funding will hire workers and produce. The market for intermediate goods is competitive. Each producing firm in the intermediate good sector hires a continuum of workers that includes each type of labor service offered by the household.

Firms in the final good sector purchase the intermediate good and costlessly transform it into a continuum of differentiated final goods sold to the household in a market characterized by monopolistic competition. We assume final goods firms face Calvo pricing restrictions.\(^8\)

\(^8\)The separation between final and intermediate good sectors simplifies the difficulties associated with having a producing firm set its output price and bargain with a bank simultaneously.
3.2.1 Final good producers

We assume there is a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms indexed by \( j \), each producing a differentiated final good. All firms in the final good sector have access to the following technology:

\[
Y^f_t(j) = X_t(j)
\]  

(20)

where \( X_t(j) \) is the quantity of the single intermediate good used to produce the final good variety \( j \). Final good producers purchase \( X_t(j) \) from intermediate good producers in a competitive market at the common price \( P^I_t \) and sell their output directly to households as a differentiated final good. Each final good producer faces the following demand schedule obtained from the household decision problem

\[
Y^f_t(j) = \left( \frac{P_t(j)}{P_t} \right)^{-\epsilon_p} C_t
\]

(21)

where \( C_t \) is the aggregate demand for final or consumption goods.

**Price setting** Prices for final goods are sticky as in Calvo (1983). Let \( 1 - \theta_p \) be the probability that a firm adjusts its price each period. The nominal total cost for a final good producer of variety \( j \) is \( TC^n_t(j) = P^I_t X_t(j) \) with nominal marginal cost \( MC^n_t(j) = P^I_t \). As usual, by symmetry, all intermediate good producers who set prices in period \( t \) will choose the same price, denoted by \( P^*_t \), since they face an identical problem given by

\[
\max E_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\theta_p)^k \Delta_{t,t+k} \left\{ P^*_t Y^f_{t+k|t} - TC^n_t(Y^f_{t+k|t}) \right\}
\]

s.t

\[
Y_{t+k|t} = \left( \frac{P^*_t}{P^*_{t+k}} \right)^{-\epsilon_p} C_{t+k} \quad \text{for } k = 0, 1, 2, \ldots,
\]

(22)

(23)

where \( \Delta_{t,t+k} \) is the household stochastic discount factor and \( Y^f_{t+k|t} \) denotes the demand faced at \( t+k \) for a firm that last reset its price in period \( t \), which is consistent with the households’ optimality condition with respect to each final good variety. The resulting first order condition for the price setting problem implies,

\[
E_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\theta_p)^k \Delta_{t,t+k} Y^f_{t+k|t} \left\{ \frac{P^*_t}{P^*_{t+k}} - \frac{\epsilon_p}{\epsilon_p - 1} \frac{P^I_t}{P^*_{t+k}} \right\} = 0
\]

(24)

Final good producers obtain nominal profits at the end of the period of \( \Pi^f_t(j) = P_t(j) Y^f_t(j) - P^I_t X_t(j) \). The monopolistic structure together with Calvo nominal price rigidites implies the following aggregate price index \( P_t \) for the final good:

\[
P_t^{1-\epsilon_p} = \theta_p (P_{t-1})^{1-\epsilon_p} + (1 - \theta_p) (P^*_t)^{1-\epsilon_p}
\]

(25)
The recursive formulation of the optimal price setting equation is

\[ g_{1,t} = \left( \frac{\epsilon_p}{\epsilon_p - 1} \right) g_{2,t} \quad (26) \]

\[ g_{1,t} = \beta C_t \Pi^*_t + \theta_p \epsilon_t \left( \frac{\Pi^*_t}{\Pi^*_{t+1}} \right) g_{1,t+1} \quad (27) \]

\[ g_{2,t} = \beta \frac{1}{\mu^*_t} C_t + \theta_p \epsilon_t g_{2,t+1} \quad (28) \]

where \( \Pi^*_t = \frac{P^*_t}{P_t} \), \( \mu^*_t = \frac{P^*_t}{P^*_t} \) is the mark-up of final good over intermediate good prices, \( g_{1,t} \) and \( g_{2,t} \) are auxiliary variables. Notice that up to a first order approximation the above three equations imply that deviations of the inflation rate with respect to steady state inflation are inversely related to deviations of the mark-up with respect to its steady state.

### 3.2.2 Intermediate good producers

We assume intermediate good producers must search for external funding in order to produce. A firm with financing operates a production technology and produces a homogeneous intermediate good indexed by \( z \) in a perfectly competitive market. Nominal total costs for an intermediate goods firm includes total labor cost, \( R_{lt} (j, \omega_{z,t}) W_t N_t (\omega_{z,t}) \), plus the fixed cost of production, \( P_I t x^f \), where \( R_{lt} (j, \omega_{z,t}) \) is the gross loan interest rate negotiated bilaterally between bank ‘j’ and firm ‘z’.

In this subsection, we first describe the technology, labor demand and nominal profits for a firm that has obtained financing. In the next section, we describe the loan market and the decisions each intermediate goods producer must take when searching for external funds or after obtaining a bank loan.

**Technology and labor demand** If an intermediate goods producer is matched with a bank, it is endowed with the following technology:

\[ y_t (\omega_{z,t}) = \xi_{p,f} A_t (\omega_{z,t}) N_t (\omega_{z,t})^\alpha \quad (29) \]

where \( \xi_{p,f} \) is a scale technology parameter, \( A_t \) is the aggregate productivity level, \( \omega_{z,t} \) is a firm-specific idiosyncratic productivity level drawn from a uniform distribution function \( G(\omega) \) with support \( [\omega^- \omega^+ \] , and \( N_t (\omega_{z,t}) \) is the firm’s employment index given by

\[ N_t (\omega_{z,t}) = \left( \int_0^{\frac{1}{1 - e w}} N_t (i, \omega_{z,t}) \frac{e w - 1}{e w - 1} \, di \right)^{\frac{e w}{e w - 1}} \quad (30) \]

where \( N_t (i, \omega_{z}) \) is the demand for labor type \( i \) by firm \( z \). Cost minimization, taking wages as given, implies
the following demand for labor type $i$:

$$N_t (i, \omega_z, t) = \left( \frac{W_t (i)}{W_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon_w} N_t (\omega_z, t) \text{ for all } i \quad (31)$$

The aggregate demand for labor type $i$ is obtained by aggregating $N_t (i, \omega_z)$ across all producing firms

$$N_t (i) = \int z N_t (i, \omega_z) dz = \left( \frac{W_t (i)}{W_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon_w} \int z N_t (\omega_z) dz$$

where $\int z N_t (\omega_z) dz$ denotes the aggregate labor index of all producing intermediate goods firms during period $t$ and $W_t$ denotes the aggregate wage index.\(^9\) Wages must be paid in advance of production to the household and can only be funded by external bank finance. The nominal loan each intermediate goods producer must obtain is given by their wage bill during period $t$:

$$L_t (\omega_z, t) = \int_0^1 W_t (i) N_t (i, \omega_z, t) di = W_t N_t (\omega_z, t) \quad (32)$$

We assume loans are paid back to the bank with a gross interest rate $R_l (j, \omega_z, t)$ at the end of the period and no default occurs. End of the period real profits, for an intermediate good producer with funding and idiosyncratic productivity, $\omega_z, t$, is:

$$\pi_t (\omega_z, t) = \frac{y_t (\omega_z, t)}{\mu_t} - x_t - R_l (j, \omega_z, t) l_t (j, \omega_z, t) \quad (33)$$

Where the loan principle expressed in real terms is the real wage bill of the firm and it is given by $l_t (j, \omega_z, t) = w_t N_t (\omega_z, t)$. The loan contract requires the repayment of the total debt with the bank, including interest, $R_l (j, \omega_z, t) l_t (j, \omega_z, t)$ within the same period.

### 3.3 A decentralized loan market

We assume the process of finding a credit partner is costly in terms of time and resources. Intermediate good producers and banks face search and matching frictions that prevent instantaneous trading in the loan market, implying not all market participants will end up matched at a given point in time. Upon a successful match, bilateral Nash bargaining between the parties determines the firm’s employment level and the way the match surplus is shared. We allow for both exogenous and endogenous destruction of credit matches, and

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\(^9\)Note that $z$ indexes the mass of active intermediate good producers in the economy. The upper limit of $z$ measures the total number of producing firms which is determined in equilibrium. As explained below, in equilibrium, the total number of intermediate good producers is less than one whenever there are search frictions in the loan market.
a matching technology that determines the aggregate flow of new credit relationships over time as a function of the relative number of lenders and borrowers searching for credit partners.

We assume a continuum of banks and firms with the number of banks seeking borrowers varying endogenously and being determined by a free entry condition to the loan market. We assume that banks have a constant returns to scale technology for managing loans so that we can treat each loan as a separate match between a bank and a firm. Each intermediate good producer is endowed with one project and is either searching for funding or involved in an ongoing credit contract with a bank. If a firm is matched with a bank, the bank extends the necessary funds to allow the firm to hire workers and produce.\textsuperscript{10}

### 3.3.1 The matching process

Firms searching for external funds, $f_t$, are matched to banks seeking for borrowers, $b_t^c$, according to the following constant returns to scale matching function

$$m_t = \mu f_t^\nu (b_t^c)^{1-\nu}$$

The function $m_t$ determines the flow of new credit contracts during date $t$; $\mu$ is a scale parameter that measures the productivity of the matching function and $0 < \nu < 1$ is the elasticity of the match arrival with respect to the mass of searching firms.

**Matching rates** The variable $\tau_t = f_t/b_t^c$ is the measure of credit market tightness. The probability that an intermediate good producer with an unfunded project is matched with a bank seeking to lend at date $t$ is denoted by $p_t^f$ and is given by

$$p_t^f = \mu \tau_t^\nu$$

Similarly, the probability that any bank seeking borrowers is matched with an unfunded entrepreneur at time $t$ is denoted by $p_t^b$ and is given by

$$p_t^b = \mu \tau_t^\nu$$

Since $\tau_t = p_t^b/p_t^f$, a rise in $\tau_t$ implies it is easier for a bank to find a borrower relative to a firm finding a lender and so corresponds to a tighter credit market and reducing the expected time a bank must search for a credit partner, lowering the bank’s expected pecuniary search costs. At any date $t$ the number of newly matched banks must equal the number of newly matched firms, or $p_t^b b_t^c = p_t^f f_t$.

\textsuperscript{10}In appendix E, we introduce the possibility that borrowers may abscond with the funds obtained from banks. Given this, banks introduce an incentive compatibility constraint in the loan contract. We assume that in the case of absconding the firm is able to produce and generate profits but does not repay the bank. The bank is able to recover an exogenous fraction of the profits made by the intermediate good producer who is then barred from participation in the loan market. The optimal credit contract in this scenario is characterized by credit rationing. A bank will prefer to loan only a fraction of its funds and leave the remainder as excess reserves at the central bank.
Separations and the evolution of loan contracts  Credit relationships may end exogenously with probability $\delta_t$ whose process is explained below. Contractual parties engaged in a credit relationship that survives this exogenous separation hazard can also decide to dissolve the contract depending on the realization of the productivity of the firm’s project. The decision to endogenously dissolve a credit relationship is characterized by an optimal reservation policy with respect to $\omega_{z,t}$ and denoted by $\tilde{\omega}_t$. If the realization of $\omega_{z,t}$ is above the firm specific productivity cut-off, both parties agree to continue the credit relationship, allowing the entrepreneur to produce conditional on surviving the exogenous separation hazard. On the contrary, if the realization of $\omega_{z,t}$ is below $\tilde{\omega}_t$, both parties choose to dissolve the credit relationship. The probability of endogenous termination of a credit match is $\gamma_t(\tilde{\omega}_t) \equiv \text{prob}(\omega_{z,t} \leq \tilde{\omega}_t) = G(\tilde{\omega}_t)$ while the overall separation rate is $\delta_t + (1 - \delta_t) \gamma_t(\tilde{\omega}_t)$. Existence and uniqueness of the optimal reservation policy $\tilde{\omega}_t$ are shown in appendix C.

Let $f^m_{t-1}$ be the measure of intermediate good producers that enter period $t$ matched with a bank. Of those, $(1 - \delta_t) f^m_{t-1}$ firms survive the exogenous hazard and a fraction $\gamma_t(\tilde{\omega}_t)$ of the survivals receive idiosyncratic productivity shocks that are less than $\tilde{\omega}_t$ and so do not produce. The number of intermediate good producers that actually produce in period $t$, therefore, is $(1 - \delta_t)(1 - \gamma_t(\tilde{\omega}_t)) f^m_{t-1}$. The number of firms in a credit relationship at the end of period $t$, denoted by $f^m_t$, is given by the number of firms producing during time $t$ plus all the new matches formed at time $t$. Then, the evolution of $f^m_t$ is expressed as

$$f^m_t = \varphi_t(\tilde{\omega}_t) f^m_{t-1} + m_t$$

where $\varphi_t(\tilde{\omega}_t)$ is the overall continuation rate of a credit relationship defined to be:

$$\varphi_t(\tilde{\omega}_t) = (1 - \delta_t)(1 - \gamma_t(\tilde{\omega}_t))$$

and $1 - \varphi_t(\tilde{\omega}_t) = \delta_t + (1 - \delta_t) \gamma_t(\tilde{\omega}_t)$ denotes the overall separation rate.

We normalize the total number of potential intermediate good producers in every period to one and assume that if a credit relationship is exogenously dissolved at time $t$, both parties start searching immediately during the period. If the credit relationship survives the exogenous separation hazard but then endogenously dissolves, both parties must wait until the next period to start searching for a credit partner again. This assumption implies that the number of firms seeking finance during period $t$, which we have denoted by $f_t$, is equal to the number of searching firms at the beginning of time $t$, $(1 - f^m_{t-1})$ plus the number of firms that started the period matched with a bank but were exogenously separated ($\delta_t f^m_{t-1}$). Therefore,

$$f_t = 1 - (1 - \delta_t) f^m_{t-1}.$$
Notice that there are still some firms that have been endogenously separated but cannot search in period $t$. These firms are unmatched but waiting to search again next period.

**Gross credit flows** Our timing assumption implies that the fraction $p_t^f \delta_t f_{t-1}^m$ of matched intermediate good producers that were exogenously separated during time $t$, are able to find a new credit relationship within the same period of time. Credit creation, $CC_t$, is defined as the number of newly created credit relationships at the end of time $t$ net of the number of exogenous credit separations that are successfully re-matched in a given period:

$$CC_t = m_t - p_t^f \delta_t f_{t-1}^m.$$  

(40)

The credit creation rate, $cc_t$ is

$$cc_t = \frac{m_t}{f_{t-1}^m} - p_t^f \delta_t.$$  

(41)

Credit destruction, $CD_t$, is defined as the total number of credit separations at the end of time $t$, $(1 - \varphi_t (\tilde{\omega}_t)) f_{t-1}^m$ net of the number of exogenous credit separations that are successfully re-matched in a given period:

$$CD_t = (1 - \varphi_t (\tilde{\omega}_t)) f_{t-1}^m - p_t^f \delta_t f_{t-1}^m.$$  

(42)

The credit destruction rate, $cd_t$, is

$$cd_t = (1 - \varphi_t (\tilde{\omega}_t)) - p_t^f \delta_t.$$  

(43)

The implied credit reallocation rate is defined by

$$cr_t = cc_t + cd_t,$$  

(44)

and net credit growth rate is

$$cg_t = cc_t - cd_t.$$  

(45)

### 3.3.2 Intermediate good producers and the loan market

As long as the credit contract prevails, the firm receives sufficient external funds to pay workers in advance of production each period. After selling its output to the final goods producers, the firm repays its debt with the bank and transfers all remaining profits to the household.$^{11}$

**Value functions** If the intermediate good producer obtains financing its instantaneous real profit flow is $\pi_t^i (\omega_{z,t})$. Profits depend on the status of the intermediate good producer, that is, whether the firm is searching for external funds or if it is producing. A firm searching for external funds obtains zero real profits since we

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$^{11}$As in Fiore and Tristani (2013), we abstract from the endogenous evolution of net worth by assuming firms do not accumulate internal funds after repaying their debt.
assume there are no extra search costs when a producer is searching for funding. Under these assumptions, the firm’s decision-making is characterized by two value functions: The value of being matched with a bank and able to produce at date \( t \), denoted by \( V_{FP}^{t} (\omega_{z,t}) \) and the value of searching for external funds at date \( t \), denoted by \( V_{FN}^{t} \), both measured in terms of current consumption of the final good\(^{12}\). \( V_{FP}^{t} (\omega_{z,t}) \) is given by

\[
V_{FP}^{t} (\omega_{z,t}) = \pi_{t} (\omega_{z,t}) + E_{t} \Delta_{t,t+1} \left\{ \left( 1 - \phi_{t} (\hat{\omega}_{t+1}) \right) V_{FN}^{t+1} + \varphi_{t} (\hat{\omega}_{t+1}) \int_{\hat{\omega}_{t+1}}^{\infty} V_{FP}^{t+1} (\omega_{z,t+1}) \frac{dG(\omega)}{1 - \gamma_{t+1} (\hat{\omega}_{t+1})} \right\}
\]

where \( \Delta_{t,t+1} = \beta\lambda_{t+1}/\lambda_{t} \) is the household stochastic discount factor. The value of producing is the flow value of current real profits plus the expected continuation value. At the end of the period, the credit relationship is dissolved with probability \( 1 - \phi_{t} (\hat{\omega}_{t+1}) \) and the firm must seek new financing. An intermediate good producer with funding at date \( t \) will continue producing at time \( t+1 \) if it survives both separation hazards which occurs with probability \( \varphi_{t} (\hat{\omega}_{t+1}) \). In the latter case, only those firms receiving an idiosyncratic productivity realization \( \omega_{z,t+1} \geq \hat{\omega}_{t+1} \) will remain matched and produce during next period. Firms with \( \omega_{z,t+1} < \hat{\omega}_{t+1} \) endogenously separate from their bank and obtain \( V_{FN}^{t+1} \).

The value of searching for external funds \( (V_{FN}^{t}) \) for a firm at date \( t \) expressed in terms of current consumption is

\[
V_{FN}^{t} = E_{t} \Delta_{t,t+1} \left\{ p_{t} \left\{ \left( 1 - \varphi_{t} (\hat{\omega}_{t+1}) \right) V_{FN}^{t+1} + \varphi_{t} (\hat{\omega}_{t+1}) \int_{\hat{\omega}_{t+1}}^{\infty} V_{FP}^{t+1} (\omega_{z,t+1}) \frac{dG(\omega)}{1 - \gamma_{t+1} (\hat{\omega}_{t+1})} \right\} + \left( 1 - p_{t} \right) V_{FN}^{t+1} \right\}
\]

where \( p_{t} \) is the probability of matching with a bank. Notice that we assume matches made in period \( t \) do not produce until \( t+1 \). Therefore a searching firm that is matched with a bank during period \( t \) will produce in period \( t+1 \) if it survives next period’s separation hazards which occurs with overall probability \( \varphi_{t} (\hat{\omega}_{t+1}) \). With probability \( (1 - p_{t}) \), the firm does not match and must continue searching for external funds during next period’s loan market.

### 3.3.3 Banks and the loan market

Banks collect deposits from households and invest them in loans with firms. The deposit market is assumed to be a centralized competitive market. Due to the decentralized nature of the loan market, some banks end the period without any loans in their portfolio. In this case, the bank deposits its funds with the central bank as excess reserves and receives an interest rate matching the interest rate on deposits, leaving the bank with negative profits due to search costs. All uncertainty is revealed before loans are extended: loans are

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\(^{12}\)See appendix C for derivations.
made and paid back during the same period. At the end of the period, the bank transfers all its profits to
the representative household.

A bank can only form a credit relationship with one firm and vice versa until separation occurs. Bank
j’s balance sheet expressed in real terms is

\[ \chi_t(j) l_t(j, \omega_{z,t}) + (1 - \chi_t(j)) \frac{ER_t(j)}{P_t} = \frac{D_t(j)}{P_t} \]  

(47)

where \( \chi_t(j) \) is an indicator function taking the value of 1 if bank \( j \) extends a loan \( l_t(j, \omega_{z,t}) \) to a firm whose
idiosyncratic productivity \( \omega_{z,t} \) exceeds a cut-off level and 0 otherwise, \( ER_t(j) \) represents nominal excess
reserves held with the central bank in case \( \chi_t(j) = 0 \) and \( D_t(j) \) are household deposits. In equilibrium,
there will be a measure of banks with positive loans and a measure of banks with excess reserves. Notice
that when the bank extends a loan (\( \chi_t(j) = 1 \)) the bank balance sheet implies that the bank lends out all of
its resources \( l_t(j, \omega_{z,t}) = \frac{D_t(j)}{P_t} \) which means there is no credit rationing. This is due to the fact there is no
default risk.

**Bank Profits**  A bank searching for a borrower will incur a search cost \( \frac{\rho^t}{P_t} \kappa \) measured in units of the final
good and earn zero profits. The current flow of profits of a bank with household deposits \( D_t(j) \) can be
written as

\[ \pi^b_t(j) = \chi_t(j) R^l_t(j, \omega_{z,t}) l_t(j, \omega_{z,t}) + (1 - \chi_t(j)) \left( R^r_t \frac{ER_t(j)}{P_t} - \frac{\kappa}{\mu^t} \right) - R^d_t D_t(j) \]  

(48)

where \( R^l_t(j, \omega_{z,t}) \) is the bilateral bargained gross loan rate between bank \( j \) and firm \( z \), \( R^r_t \) is the gross interest
rate on excess reserves and \( R^d_t = 1 + i_t \) is the gross deposit rate. The problem of a bank is to maximize its
current profits subject to its balance sheet. Optimality with respect to deposits requires that every period
(\( R^r_t - R^d_t \)) \( D_t(j) = 0 \). Since household deposits are always positive in equilibrium, the bank will choose to
collect deposits until the gross interest rate on excess reserves is equal to the gross interest rate on deposits,
that is \( R^r_t = R^d_t = R_t = 1 + i_t \). Substituting the bank’s balance sheet and the optimality conditions with
respect to \( D_t(j) \) into the profit function yields

\[ \pi^b_t(j) = \begin{cases} \pi^l_t(j, \omega_{z,t}) = (R^l_t(j, \omega_{z,t}) - R_t) l_t(j, \omega_{z,t}) & \text{if extends a loan to firm } \omega_{z,t} \\ -\frac{\kappa}{P_t^t} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \]  

(49)

The determination of \( R^l_t(j, \omega_{z,t}) \) is explained below as the result of Nash bargaining between the bank and the
intermediate good producer. The loan size is given by the labor costs of firm \( z \), that is \( l_t(j, \omega_{z,t}) = w_t N_t(\omega_{z,t}) \).

**Bank Value functions**  Under the assumptions detailed above, the problem of a bank can be characterized
by two value functions: The value of lending to a firm at date \( t \), denoted by \( V_{t}^{BL}(\omega_{z,t}) \) and the value of
searching for a potential borrower at date $t$, denoted by $V_{t}^{BN}$. Both value functions are measured in terms of current consumption of the final good and are given by

$$V_{t}^{BL}(\omega_{z,t}) = \pi_t^b(\omega_{z,t}) + E_t \Delta_{t,t+1} \left\{ (1 - \varphi_{t+1}(\tilde{\omega}_{t+1})) V_{t+1}^{BN} + \varphi_{t+1}(\tilde{\omega}_{t+1}) \int_{\tilde{\omega}_{t+1}}^{\pi} V_{t+1}^{BL}(\omega_{z,t+1}) \frac{dG(\omega)}{1 - \gamma_{t+1}(\tilde{\omega}_{t+1})} \right\}$$

and

$$V_{t}^{BN} = -\frac{\kappa}{\mu_t} + E_t \Delta_{t,t+1} \left\{ p_t^b \left[ (1 - \varphi_{t+1}(\tilde{\omega}_{t+1})) V_{t+1}^{BN} + \varphi_{t+1}(\tilde{\omega}_{t+1}) \int_{\tilde{\omega}_{t+1}}^{\pi} V_{t+1}^{BL}(\omega_{z,t+1}) \frac{dG(\omega)}{1 - \gamma_{t+1}(\tilde{\omega}_{t+1})} \right] + (1 - p_t^b) V_{t+1}^{BN} \right\}$$

The value of extending a loan is the current value of real profits plus the expected continuation value. A bank that extends a loan to a firm with idiosyncratic productivity $\omega_{z,t}$ at date $t$ will continue financing the same firm at time $t + 1$ with probability $\varphi_t(\tilde{\omega}_{t+1})$. The credit relationship is severed at time $t + 1$ with probability $\delta_t + 1 - \varphi_t(\tilde{\omega}_{t+1})$, in which case the bank obtains a future value of $V_{t+1}^{BN}$. The value of searching for a borrower at date $t$ is given by the flow value of the search costs plus the continuation value. A searching bank faces a probability $1 - p_t^b$ of not being matched during time $t$, obtaining a future value of $V_{t+1}^{BN}$ but a probability $p_t^b$ of being matched. If a searching bank ends up being matched with a firm at time $t$, then at the beginning of period $t + 1$ it will face a probability of separation before extending the loan.

**Free entry condition** In equilibrium, free entry of banks into the loan market ensures that $V_{t}^{BN} = 0$ for all $t$. Using this in $V_{t}^{BN}$, the free entry condition can be written as

$$\frac{\kappa}{\mu_t p_t^b} = E_t \Delta_{t,t+1} \left\{ \varphi_{t+1}(\tilde{\omega}_{t+1}) \int_{\tilde{\omega}_{t+1}}^{\pi} V_{t+1}^{BL}(\omega_{z,t+1}) \frac{dG(\omega)}{1 - \gamma_{t+1}(\tilde{\omega}_{t+1})} \right\}$$

(51)

Banks will enter the loan market until the expected cost of finding a borrower $\frac{\kappa}{\mu_t p_t^b}$ is equal to the expected benefit of extending a loan to a firm with idiosyncratic productivity $\omega_{z,t+1} \geq \tilde{\omega}_{t+1}$. As banks enter the market, the probability a searching bank finds a borrower will fall, up to the point where equality of the above condition is restored. Note that free entry of banks into the loan market modifies the value function $V_{t}^{BL}(\omega_{z,t})$ as follows

$$V_{t}^{BL}(\omega_{z,t}) = \pi_t^b(\omega_{z,t}) + E_t \Delta_{t,t+1} \left\{ \varphi_{t+1}(\tilde{\omega}_{t+1}) \int_{\tilde{\omega}_{t+1}}^{\pi} V_{t+1}^{BL}(\omega_{z,t+1}) \frac{dG(\omega)}{1 - \gamma_{t+1}(\tilde{\omega}_{t+1})} \right\}$$

(52)
The net surplus for bank extending a loan to a firm with productivity $\omega_{z,t}$ is

\[ V_{t}^{BS}(\omega_{z,t}) = \pi_{t}^{b}(\omega_{z,t}) + \frac{K_{t}}{\mu_{t}^{b}P_{t}} \] (53)

### 3.3.4 Employment and the loan contract: Nash bargaining

At any point in time, a matched firm and bank that survive the exogenous and endogenous separation hazards engage in bilateral bargaining over the interest rate and loan size to split the joint surplus resulting from the match.\(^{13}\) This joint surplus is defined as

\[ V_{t}^{JS}(\omega_{z,t}) = V_{t}^{FS}(\omega_{z,t}) + V_{t}^{BS}(\omega_{z,t}) \]

and it is given by

\[ V_{t}^{JS}(\omega_{z,t}) = y_{t}(\omega_{z,t}) - x_{t}f_{t}R_{t} + \int \omega_{t+1}dG(\omega) - w_{t}R_{t} \] (54)

Let $\bar{\eta}$ be the firm’s share of the joint surplus, and $1 - \bar{\eta}$ the banks’. The Nash bargaining problem for an active credit relationship is

\[ \max \left\{ R_{t}^{j}(\omega_{z,t}), l_{t}(\omega_{z,t}) \right\} \left( V_{t}^{FS}(\omega_{z,t}) \right)^{\eta} \left( V_{t}^{BS}(\omega_{z,t}) \right)^{1-\eta} \] (55)

where $V_{t}^{FS}(\omega_{z,t})$ and $V_{t}^{BS}(\omega_{z,t})$ are defined above. The first order conditions imply the following optimal sharing rule:

\[ \eta V_{t}^{BS}(\omega_{z,t}) = (1 - \eta) V_{t}^{FS}(\omega_{z,t}) \] (56)

and an employment condition that sets the marginal product of labor equal to a markup $\mu_{t}^{p}$ over the marginal cost of labor inclusive of the bank’s opportunity cost when extending a loan to an intermediate good producer:

\[ \alpha \xi^{p}f_{t}(\omega_{z,t})^{a}N^{*}_{t}(\omega_{z,t})^{a-1} = \mu_{t}^{p}w_{t}R_{t} \] (57)

Notice that $w_{t}R_{t}$ is expressed in terms of the final good and it has to be transformed back in terms of the intermediate good as it is the marginal product of labor. We refer to $\mu_{t}^{p}w_{t}R_{t}$ as the Nash bargained marginal cost of labor expressed in terms of the intermediate good to differentiate it with the actual real marginal cost of labor expressed in terms of the intermediate good of a producing firm which depends on the loan interest rate and it is given by $\mu_{t}^{p}w_{t}R_{t}^{j}(\omega_{z,t})$.

The loan interest rate derived here simply ensures the joint surplus generated by a credit relationship is divided optimally between the firm and the bank, with the relevant interest rate capturing the cost channel being $R_{t}$, the bank’s opportunity cost of funds. As mentioned in the introduction, even though firms face different interest rates on bank loans, since the loan rate depends on the firms’ idiosyncratic productivity

\(^{13}\)See Appendix C for derivations.
realization, the interest cost relevant for labor demand is the same for all firms. In this sense, the Nash bargained loan rates, \( R^l_i(j, \omega_{z,t}) \), are non-allocative. The allocative role of prices in the credit market is accomplished through credit market tightness, \( \tau_t \).

The optimal loan principal negotiated between credit partners is

\[
l^*_t(j, \omega_{z,t}) = \left( \frac{\alpha \xi pf A_t \omega_{z,t}}{\mu^l_t w^*_t R_t} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}
\]

with an equilibrium loan interest rate

\[
R^l_t(j, \omega_{z,t}) = \frac{1}{l^*_t(j, \omega_{z,t})} \left( (1 - \eta) \left( y^*_t(\omega_{z,t}) - x^f \right) \right) + \eta \left( R_t w^*_t N^*_t(\omega_{z,t}) - \frac{\kappa pf^l \mu^l_t}{\mu^l_t \mu^l_t} \right)
\]

The loan interest rate divides the joint surplus of a credit match in such a manner that a fraction \( 1 - \bar{\eta} \) of the firm profits relative to the loan principal is obtained by the bank while a fraction \( \bar{\eta} \) of the bank’s opportunity cost of lending net of search costs and relative to the loan principal is obtained by the firm.

The above conditions imply that firm \( z \) with \( \omega_{z,t} \geq \bar{\omega}_t \) will produce \( y^*_t(\omega_{z,t}) \) units of the intermediate good and employ \( N^*_t(\omega_{z,t}) \) workers, given by:

\[
y^*_t(\omega_{z,t}) = \left( \xi pf A_t \omega_{z,t} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left( \frac{\alpha}{\mu^l_t w^*_t R_t} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}
\]

\[
N^*_t(\omega_{z,t}) = \left( \frac{\alpha \xi pf A_t \omega_{z,t}}{\mu^l_t w^*_t R_t} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}
\]

Notice that the credit contract implies that in equilibrium, there will be a distribution in the size of firms such that more productive firms will be able to obtain a greater amount of lending, hire more workers and become larger firms, conditional on surviving.

### 3.3.5 The optimal reservation policy: Endogenous separations

The joint surplus of a credit relationship can be written explicitly as a function of the idiosyncratic productivity shock \( \omega_{z,t} \) in order to facilitate the characterization of the loan market equilibrium as follows

\[
V^{JS}_t(\omega_{z,t}) = \frac{1}{\mu^l_t} \left( 1 - \alpha \right) \left( \xi pf A_t \omega_{z,t} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left( \frac{\alpha}{\mu^l_t w^*_t R_t} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} - x^f + \frac{\kappa}{\mu^l_t} \left( 1 - \bar{\eta} \right)
\]

The optimal reservation policy with respect to the idiosyncratic productivity shock implies that

\[
if \quad \omega_{i,t} \leq \bar{\omega}_t \quad \Rightarrow \quad V^{JS}_t(\omega_{i,t}) \leq 0
\]

\[
if \quad \omega_{i,t} > \bar{\omega}_t \quad \Rightarrow \quad V^{JS}_t(\omega_{i,t}) > 0.
\]
Since the joint surplus is increasing in the firm’s idiosyncratic productivity, there is an unique threshold level \( \tilde{\omega}_t \) defined by
\[
V_t^{JS} (\tilde{\omega}_t) = 0
\] (63)
such that the joint surplus is negative for any firm facing an idiosyncratic productivity \( \omega_{i,t} < \tilde{\omega}_t \). The optimal threshold level \( \tilde{\omega}_t \) is
\[
\tilde{\omega}_t = \left( \frac{1}{\alpha} \left( \frac{\mu_t w_t R_t}{1-\alpha} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{(1-\alpha)}} - \frac{\eta \mu_t}{(1-\eta)} \right) \left( \frac{\kappa \mu_t}{\eta} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}
\] (64)

Since \( \tilde{\omega}_t \) is independent of \( i \), the cutoff value is the same for all firms and banks. Moreover, it is decreasing in aggregate productivity \( A_t \) so that a positive aggregate productivity shock means the number of credit matches that separate endogenously falls and more matched firms produce. The cutoff value is increasing in the Nash bargained marginal cost of labor \( (\mu_t w_t R_t) \), and the firm’s fixed cost of production \( (x^f) \).

The bank’s opportunity cost of funds \( R_t \) influences the level of economic activity at both the extensive and intensive margins. A rise in \( R_t \) increases the threshold level of the idiosyncratic productivity, \( \tilde{\omega}_t \), of firms that obtain a positive joint surplus. As a consequence, fewer firms are able to secure financing and produce. This is the extensive margin effect. Conditional on producing, firms equate the marginal product of labor to the Nash bargained marginal cost, \( \mu_t w_t R_t \), so that an increase in \( R_t \), ceteris paribus, reduces labor demand at each level of the real wage. This is the intensive margin effect. Both channels work to reduce aggregate output as \( R_t \) rises. In addition, credit market conditions reflected in \( p_f^t \) (the probability of a firm matching with a bank) and \( p_b^t \) (the probability of a bank matching with a firm) directly affect the extensive margin; a rise in \( \tau_t \) (a credit tightening) increases \( \tilde{\omega}_t \) and fewer firms obtain credit. Both interest costs measured by \( R \) and credit conditions measured by \( \tau \) matter for employment and output.\(^{14}\)

Finally, the evolution of credit market tightness is obtained by using the free entry condition, the Nash bargaining sharing rule, and the definition of the joint surplus of a credit relationship, and it is given by the following Euler equation for \( \tau_t \):
\[
-\frac{\kappa}{\mu_t \mu_{\tau_t}} \mathbb{E}_t \Delta_{t+1} \varphi_{t+1} (\tilde{\omega}_{t+1}) \left( 1 - \eta \mu_t \tau_{t+1} \right) \frac{1}{\mu_t \mu_{\tau_t} \tau_{t+1}} = \left( 1 - \eta \right) \mathbb{E}_t \Delta_{t+1} \left( 1 - \alpha \right) \frac{Y_{t+1}}{f_{t+1}} - \varphi_{t+1} (\tilde{\omega}_{t+1}) x^f
\] (65)

The aggregate dynamics for \( \tau_t \) are determined by the point where the average current cost of searching for productive borrowers is equal to the average expected benefit of extending a loan. The latter has two components: (i) The average expected output produced by all active intermediate firms net of the average fixed cost of production and (ii) The expected average savings in search costs in \( t+1 \) conditional on surviving

\(^{14}\)See Appendix C for derivations of the loan market equilibrium.
the credit separation hazards.

### 3.4 Government

**Central bank budget constraint** There are no government bonds in this economy but the central bank pays the same interest rate as the banks’ deposit rate on excess reserves. Therefore, the central bank’s budget constraint is given by:

\[ i_t ER_t + RCB_t = M_t - M_{t-1} \]  \hspace{1cm} (66)

where \( RCB_t \) denotes the central bank transfers to the treasury and \( M_t \) is the money supply. Aggregate excess reserves, \( ER_t \), are obtained by integrating across the measure of banks not able to extend loans to intermediate good producers within the period, that is

\[ ER_t = \int_j (1 - \chi_t(j)) \frac{ER_t(j)}{P_t} \, dj \]  \hspace{1cm} (67)

where as explained above, \( \chi_t(j) \) is an indicator function taking the value of 1 if the bank extends a loan and 0 if the bank maintains its funds as excess reserves with the central bank.

**Consolidated government budget constraint** Combining the above two constraints for the government sector yields the following consolidated budget constraint:

\[ M_t - M_{t-1} = P_t T_t + i_t ER_t \]  \hspace{1cm} (68)

where the treasury budget constraint is defined as \( RCB_t = P_t T_t \).

**Monetary policy** We assume that the central bank follows an exogenous growth rate for the nominal supply of money given by

\[ M_t = (1 + \theta_t) M_{t-1} \]  \hspace{1cm} (69)

where \( \theta_t \) denotes the nominal money growth given by

\[ \left( \frac{\theta_t}{\theta} \right) = \left( \frac{\theta_{t-1}}{\theta} \right)^{p^g} \exp \left( \varepsilon_t^\theta \right) \]  \hspace{1cm} (70)

Notice that in this case, the nominal interest rate on deposits, \( R_t \), will be an endogenous variable clearing the market for real money balances.\(^{15}\)

\(^{15}\) In appendix D, we develop the case of a cashless economy where monetary policy follows a Taylor rule.
3.5 Aggregation and Market Clearing

**Final goods sector**  Market clearing in the final goods market requires demand to equal supply for each final good which implies:

\[
C_t(j) = Y_t^f(j) \quad \text{for all } j
\]  

(71)

Using the same CES aggregator for final consumption goods as the one used for final goods yields the following aggregate equilibrium condition:

\[
C_t^f = Y_t^f
\]  

(72)

Aggregating individual production functions across all final good producers and taking into account that the demand schedule must be consistent with household optimization, gives us the following condition:

\[
C_t\Delta_P^f = X_t
\]  

(73)

where \(X_t = \int X(j) \, dj\) and \(\Delta_P^f = \int \left( \frac{P_t(j)}{P_t} \right)^{-\epsilon_p} \, dj\) measures price dispersion.

**Intermediate good sector**  Recall that firms and goods in the intermediate good sector are indexed by the idiosyncratic productivity of each active producer, \(\omega_{z,t}\). The equilibrium condition in this market is given by

\[
X_t(\omega_{z,t}) = y_t(\omega_{z,t}) \quad \text{for all } z
\]  

(74)

where the demand for each intermediate good is denoted by \(X_t(\omega_{z,t})\) and comes from the final good producers. Aggregating across each of the \(z\) producers yields the following market clearing condition

\[
X_t = \int z y_t(\omega_{z,t}) \, dz
\]

\[= Y_t^I
\]

where \(Y_t^I\) denotes the aggregate supply of intermediate goods and is given by the total number of producing firms \((1 - \delta_t)(1 - \gamma_t(\bar{\omega}_t))\) \(f_{t-1}^{m-1}\) times their average output, that is

\[
Y_t^I = (1 - \delta_t)(1 - \gamma_t(\bar{\omega}_t)) f_{t-1}^{m-1} E [y_t^*(\omega_{z,t}) | \omega_{z,t} \geq \bar{\omega}_t]
\]  

(75)
where \( E[y^*_t(\omega_{z,t}) \mid \omega_{z,t} \geq \tilde{\omega}_t] = \int_{\tilde{\omega}_t}^{\omega_{z,t}} y^*_t(\omega_{z,t}) \frac{g(\omega)d\omega}{(1-\gamma_t)} \) is average output for all active intermediate good producers.

Assuming that \( g(\omega) \) is a uniform distribution allows us to explicitly calculate the truncated expectation of \( y^*_t(\omega_{z,t}) \forall \omega_{z,t} > \tilde{\omega}_t \) and compute \( Y^I_t \) as

\[
Y^I_t = (1 - \delta_t) (1 - \gamma_t (\tilde{\omega}_t)) f_{t-1} m^{n} E \left[ y^*_t(\omega_{z,t}) \mid \omega_{z,t} \geq \tilde{\omega}_t \right] = (1 - \delta_t) \left( \frac{\xi^{pf} A_t}{\mu_t^R w_t R_t} \right) \frac{1}{1-\alpha} \left( \frac{(\omega)^k - (\tilde{\omega}_t)^k}{k(\omega - \omega)} \right) f_{t-1} m^{n} \Delta w_t
\]

where \( k = \frac{2-\alpha}{1-\alpha} \). Note that \( Y^I_t \) depends directly on the measure of firms matched with a bank at the beginning of the period \( f_{t-1} m^{n} \), on the probability that a credit contract survives during the period but scaled by \( k: (1 - \delta_t) \left( \frac{(\omega)^k - (\tilde{\omega}_t)^k}{k(\omega - \omega)} \right) \), and on the aggregate productivity shock, \( A_t \). Moreover, \( Y^I_t \) depends inversely on the Nash bargained real marginal cost of labor expressed in terms of the intermediate good, \( \mu_t^R R_t w_t \).

**Labor market**

The aggregate labor demand, defined as \( N_t = \int_{i \in I} \int_{\omega_{z,t}}^{1} N_t(i, \omega_{z,t}) \ d i d z \), is a downward sloped schedule in the real wage-employment/labor force space since it directly depends on the Nash bargained marginal cost of labor which in turn depends on the real wage, the nominal deposit interest rate and the price mark-up. Following the same steps as for aggregating the intermediate good, \( Y^I_t \), the double integral that defines \( N_t \) can be expressed as the total number of producing firms times their average labor demand:

\[
N_t = (1 - \delta_t) (1 - \gamma_t (\tilde{\omega}_t)) f_{t-1} m^{n} E \left[ N^*_t(\omega_{z,t}) \mid \omega_{z,t} \geq \tilde{\omega}_t \right] = (1 - \delta_t) \left( \frac{\alpha \xi^{pf} A_t}{\mu_t^R w_t R_t} \right) \frac{1}{1-\alpha} \left( \frac{(\omega)^k - (\tilde{\omega}_t)^k}{k(\omega - \omega)} \right) f_{t-1} m^{n} \Delta w_t
\]

Aggregating individual labor demands implies integrating along the index \( z \). The upper limit of \( z \) is given by the fraction of active intermediate good producers which is an endogenous variable in our setting and is given by \( (1 - \delta_t) (1 - \gamma_t (\tilde{\omega}_t)) f_{t-1} m^{n} \).

The labor supply or aggregate labor force schedule is obtained by aggregating over all marginal suppliers of each labor type and it is given by

\[
w_t = R_t C_t \chi_t(L_t)^{\gamma_t}
\]

The labor supply is a positively sloped schedule due to the presence of the aggregate labor market participation condition. As in Galí (2010), the unemployment rate corresponds to the horizontal gap between the labor supply and the labor demand schedules at the level of the prevailing average real wage. In this model, the position of the labor demand and supply schedules depends directly on \( R_t \) due to the presence
of a working capital channel. More importantly, the position of the labor demand schedule directly depends on the cutoff productivity value, $\bar{\omega}_t$, the exogenous probability of credit separation $\delta_t$, and on the measure of active intermediate good producers $f_{m-1}^t$, which reflects the impact of search frictions in the loan market on the labor market.

**Aggregate technology and TFP for the intermediate good sector** Combining the above equations for $Y^I_t$ and $N_t$ and letting $F_t = (1 - \delta_t) \left( \frac{(\omega^k - \tilde{\omega}^k)^k}{k! \omega} \right) f_{m-1}^t$, yields the following expression for the aggregate production function in the intermediate good sector:

$$Y^I_t = \xi^f A_t (F_t)^{1-\alpha} \left( \frac{N_t}{\Delta w_t} \right)^\alpha$$

where

$$N_t = \left( \frac{\alpha \xi^f A_t}{\mu^p_t w_t R_t} \right)^{1-\alpha} F_t \Delta w_t^\alpha$$

Notice that $F_t$ is the endogenous component of total factor productivity for the aggregate technology of the intermediate good sector and defined to be defined as $TFP_t = \xi^f A_t (F_t)^{1-\alpha}$. $F_t$ depends on the exogenous separation rate, the measure of producing firms and on credit conditions that are reflected on the reservation productivity. The assumption that $\omega_{z,t}$ follows a uniform distribution with support $[\tilde{\omega}, \bar{\omega}]$ implies a total continuation rate given by $\varphi_t (\tilde{\omega}_t) = (1 - \delta_t) \left( \frac{\tilde{\omega}_t}{\bar{\omega}_t} \right)$.

**Deposit and loan markets** The deposit market equilibrium implies that households have deposits in all active banks, therefore in the aggregate equilibrium $D_t = \int_j D_t (j) \, dj$ must hold. Since all active intermediate good producers take loans to cover their wage bill, market clearing in the loan market requires

$$l^*_t (j, \omega_{z,t}) = w_t N^*_t (\omega_{z,t}) \text{ for all } z$$

Aggregating the above condition across all active intermediate good producers and taking into account the wage heterogeneity due to the wage rigidity assumption, yields the following expression for aggregate loans:

$$l_t = \frac{w_t N_t}{\Delta w_t}$$

Aggregating $l_t (j, \omega_{z,t}) = d_t (j)$, where $d_t (j)$ denotes real deposits at bank $j$, across all active intermediate good producers and all lending banks yields an aggregate relation between loans and deposits:

$$l_t = \varphi_t (\tilde{\omega}_t) f_{m-1}^t d_t$$
Thus in the aggregate, loans are a fraction of deposits. The specific fraction is endogenous and given by the measure of active credit contracts during period \( t \) which is \( \varphi_t (\hat{\omega}_t) f_{t-1}^m \). By the same token, the aggregate level of excess reserves is the fraction of real deposits banks were not able to lend out to firms, that is

\[
er_t = (1 - \varphi_t (\hat{\omega}_t) f_{t-1}^m) d_t
\]  

Equilibrium in this economy also takes into consideration the aggregate balance sheet for banks

\[
l_t + er_t + \xi^{bs} = d_t
\]  

where \( \xi^{bs} \) is a fixed residual that we use for calibration. It represents residual assets in the banking sector.

**Household** Intermediate good producers, final good producers, and banks transfer their profits to the household at the end of each period. The aggregate real transfer received by the household from banks and each type of firm is given by

\[
\pi^b_t = (R^l_t - R_t) l_t - b_t^x \kappa
\]

\[
\pi^f_t = Y_t^f - R^l_t l_t - \varphi_t (\hat{\omega}_t) f_{t-1}^m x^f
\]

\[
\pi^I_t = C_t \left( 1 - \frac{\Delta_t}{\mu_t} \right)
\]

where \( R^l_t \) is the average loan rate defined below.

**Goods and Money Markets** Taking into account all of the aggregate equilibrium conditions and budget constraints, the aggregate resource constraint in this economy is characterized by

\[
C_t = Y^f_t = Y^f_t - (b_t^x \kappa + \varphi_t (\hat{\omega}_t) f_{t-1}^m x^f)
\]

Therefore equilibrium in the final goods market requires that consumption equals aggregate household income which, in turn, is equal to aggregate production of the intermediate good net of aggregate search and fixed costs. On the other hand, aggregating the CIA constraint, together with the government budget constraint, the aggregate balance sheet of banks as well as the aggregate equilibrium condition in the loan market, yields the following equilibrium condition for the real money balances market:

\[
C_t = m_t - (1 + i_t) er_t
\]

The above equilibrium condition implies the aggregate supply of real money balances is allocated to
aggregate consumption as well as repaying excess reserves holdings.

Finally, we define the average spread of interest rates (average credit spread) as the difference between the average loan rate and the bank’s opportunity cost of funds, given by the deposit rate:

\[
\frac{R_t^l - R_t^l}{l_t} = \frac{1}{l_t} \left[ \left( (1 - \eta) (1 - \alpha) \right) \frac{1}{\mu_t} \frac{Y_t^l}{\varphi_t (\tilde{\omega}_t) f_{t-1}^m} - \left( (1 - \eta) \frac{x^f_t}{\mu_t} + \eta \frac{\kappa}{\mu_t} \right) \right]
\]

(89)

where the terms \( R_t^l \) and \( R_t^l \) are obtained by computing the following conditional expectations:

\[
R_t^l = E \left[ R_t^l (j, \omega_{z,t}) l_t^*(\omega_{z,t}) \mid \omega_{it} \geq \tilde{\omega}_t \right]
\]

and

\[
R_t^l = E \left[ R_t^l (\omega_{it}) \mid \omega_{it} \geq \tilde{\omega}_t \right]
\]

4 Computation and simulations

The non-linear system of equations that characterizes the dynamic equilibrium of the model is summarized in the non-stochastic steady state section below and Appendix C. The vector of endogenous variables \( X_t \) is given by the following 41 variables classified according to the following groups:

1. Prices and real wages (11 variables):

\[
X_{1,t} = \left[ \Pi_t, \Pi^*_t, w_t, w_t^*, g_{1,t}, g_{2,t}, f_t^1, f_t^2, \mu_t, \Delta_t^p, \Delta_t^w \right]
\]

(90)

2. Real variables (7 variables):

\[
X_{2,t} = \left[ Y_t^l, Y_t^f, C_t, N_t, U_t, L_t, \Delta_{t+1} \right]
\]

(91)

3. “Monetary policy” variables (3 variables):

\[
X_{3,t} = \left[ m_t, e_{r_t}, R_t \right]
\]

(92)

4. Credit market variables (15 variables):

\[
X_{4,t} = \left[ l_t, d_t, \tau_t, p_t^h, p_t^f, b_t^m, f_t, F_t, \tilde{\omega}_t, \varphi_t (\tilde{\omega}_t), c_d, c_e, c_g, c_{r_t} \right]
\]

(93)

5. Auxiliary definitions for calibration purposes (4 variables):

\[
X_{5,t} = \left[ LS_t, FCS_t, \hat{\omega}_t, \hat{e}_{r_t} \right]
\]

(94)
where $LS_t$ denotes the labor share of GDP, $FCS_t$ is the fixed cost of production share of GDP, $\hat{\ell}_t$ is aggregate loans as a fraction of total deposits and $\hat{\sigma}_t$ is aggregate excess reserves as a fraction of total deposits.

The vector of endogenous variables is summarized as:

$$X_t = [X_{1,t}, X_{2,t}, X_{3,t}, X_{4,t}, X_{5,t}]$$ (95)

We solve the model using a standard perturbation method applied to a first order approximation around the non-stochastic steady-state of the model. Next we explain the computation of the steady-state as well as the calibration procedure for the unknown parameters of the model.

4.1 The non-stochastic steady state

We assume in steady state that the growth rate of real money balances is zero. This assumption together with the Euler equation evaluated at the steady state implies a gross inflation rate of $\Pi = 1$ and a gross nominal interest rate of $R = \frac{1}{\beta}$.\(^{16}\) Thus the price and wage index equations together with the price and wage dispersion equations evaluated at the steady state with zero net inflation imply no relative price and wage distortions. This implies $\Pi^* = 1, \Delta^p = 1, w^* = w$ and $\Delta^w = 1$. Similarly, the optimal price setting equation evaluated at the steady state yields the following constant markup of final goods over intermediate goods prices:

$$\mu^p = \frac{\epsilon_p}{\epsilon_p - 1}$$ (SS1)

By the same token, the wage setting equation evaluated at the steady state yields a constant markup of the real wage over the aggregate marginal rate of substitution:

$$w = \left(\frac{\epsilon_w}{\epsilon_w - 1}\right) MRS$$ (SS2)

where $MRS = C\chi N\varphi$ is the aggregate marginal rate of substitution in steady state.

Equation SS2 together with the aggregate labor force equation and the unemployment rate definition evaluated at the steady state, imply the following relationship between the unemployment rate, the gross nominal deposit rate and the elasticity among labor types $\epsilon_w$:

\(^{16}\)If the model is closed with a Taylor rule instead of a money growth rule then at the steady state the gross nominal interest rate is given by $R = \left(\frac{1}{\beta}\right) \Pi$, while the Euler equation implies $R = \frac{\Pi}{\beta}$. Since $\phi_\pi > 1$ then at the steady state $\Pi = 1$ and $R = \frac{1}{\beta}$, see appendix D for a version of the model as a cashless economy and a Taylor rule.
Notice that if we parameterize $\varphi$ and target a particular value for the unemployment rate as well as for the gross deposit rate at the steady-state, we obtain a value for the $\varepsilon_w$ parameter. Combining the resource constraint together with the aggregate CIA constraint implies:

$$Y^f = \left( A_{\xi^p f} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left( \frac{\alpha}{\mu^p w R} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left( (\varphi)^k \right) \left( \frac{k (\varphi - \tilde{\omega})}{k (\varphi - \tilde{\omega})} \right)^{f^m} = \left( \left( 1 - (1 - \delta) \frac{f^m}{\tau} \right) \kappa + \varphi (\tilde{\omega}) f^m x^f \right)$$

Aggregate labor demand, together with the aggregate ‘credit’ input denoted by $F$, implies that the following equation must hold at the steady state:

$$N = (1 - \delta) \left( \frac{\alpha A_{\xi^p f}}{\mu^p w R} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left( \left( (\varphi)^k \right) \left( \frac{k (\varphi - \tilde{\omega})}{k (\varphi - \tilde{\omega})} \right)^{f^m} \right)$$

Finally, the equilibrium in the loan market, evaluated at the steady-state, can be reduced to the following set of equations:

$$\left[ \frac{\alpha^\alpha (1 - \alpha)^{1-\alpha} A_{\xi^p f}}{\mu^p w R} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} = \left( \frac{1 - \eta \mu \tau^{\nu-1}}{1 - \eta} \right) \frac{\kappa}{\mu \tau^{\nu-1}}$$

$$\left( 1 - \beta \varphi (\tilde{\omega}) (1 - \eta \mu \tau^{\nu-1}) \right) \frac{\kappa}{\mu \tau^{\nu-1}} = (1 - \eta) \beta \left( (1 - \alpha) \frac{\alpha}{\mu^p w R} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left( 1 - \delta \right) \left( \frac{(\varphi)^k \left( \frac{k (\varphi - \tilde{\omega})}{k (\varphi - \tilde{\omega})} \right)^{f^m}}{\kappa (\varphi - \tilde{\omega})} - \varphi (\tilde{\omega}) x^f \right)$$

$$\left( 1 - \varphi (\tilde{\omega}) + (1 - \delta) \mu \tau^{\nu-1} \right) f^m = \mu \tau^{\nu-1}$$

Given our calibration strategy, the steady-state of the model can be partitioned in two blocks. The first block of equations can be solved recursively and consists of equations D1-D20 evaluated at the steady-state (See Appendix C for the list of equations). The second block of equations constitute a simultaneous system of equations that incorporate equations SS4-SS8 together with the definition of $\varphi (\tilde{\omega})$ and $cd$ (equations D27 and D34 evaluated at the steady-state). We calibrate the following subset of nine parameters: $x^f, \kappa, \mu, \xi^p f, \delta, \xi^{bs}, \chi, \alpha$ and $\varepsilon_w$ to be consistent with specified steady-state targets for the following endogenous variables: $U, N, Y^f, \varphi (\tilde{\omega}), cd, FCS, LS, \xi^f$ and $\varepsilon_f$. The strategy is explained in more detail in the next section.
4.2 Calibration

In order to compute the model’s equilibrium, we must assign values to the following list of parameters:

- Preferences: $\beta, \overline{\varphi}, \chi$
- Technology: $A, \xi^p, \alpha, x^f, [\omega, \overline{\omega}]$
- Search technology and the loan market: $\mu, \nu, \delta, \kappa, \xi_{bs}, \overline{\eta}$
- Price and wage stickiness: $\theta_p, \theta_w, \epsilon_p, \epsilon_w$
- Monetary policy: $\theta_{ss}$

We set the following subset of parameters according to convention: The subjective discount factor is set to $\beta = 0.99$ consistent with a steady-state real interest rate of 1 percent per quarter. We normalize the baseline level of technology to be $A = 1$ as well as the support for the idiosyncratic productivity to be $[\omega, \overline{\omega}] = [0, 1]$. The parameters determining the degree of price and wage stickiness are set to imply an average duration of one year, that is $\theta_p = \theta_w = 0.75$. The latter is set consistent with much of the microeconomic evidence on wage and price setting. The elasticity of substitution among final goods is set to be $\epsilon_p = 9$, implying a steady state price markup of $\mu^p = 1.125$ or 12.5% and the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity is set to be $\varphi = 5$ which corresponds to a Frisch elasticity of 0.2.

Additionally, we fix values for two of the six parameters related to the loan market: The firm’s share in the Nash bargaining problem is assumed to be $\eta = 0.35$ which is close to the 0.32 value used by Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2015). Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2015) calibrate the bank’s share, $1 - \eta$, by calculating the financial sector’s share of aggregate value-added using data and the corresponding value added definition from their model. We assume that the Hosios condition does not hold in steady state and set the elasticity of the matching function to $\nu = 0.7$, which is two times the firm’s bargaining parameter.  

In the next table we summarize the parameter values described above:

A total of nine parameters of the model are calibrated to be consistent with a set of nine endogenous steady-state targets that we specify below. These parameters are classified as follows:

- Calibrated loan market parameters: The search cost faced by a bank $\kappa$, the scale parameter of the aggregate matching function $\mu$, the exogenous probability of credit destruction $\delta$ and the residual term on the aggregate banks’ balance sheet $\xi_{bs}$.

---

17 See, for example, Nakamura and Steinsson 2008.
18 We checked the model’s robustness to the following range of values: $v \in [0.6, 0.8]$ and $\overline{\eta} \in [0.5, 0.8]$ for two reasons. First, when $v < 0.6$ the linear approximation of the dynamic equations of the model does not satisfy the Blanchard and Kahn 1980 rank condition. But second, if $\overline{\eta} < 0.5$, solving for the non-linear steady state yields imaginary roots. Both restrictions on the rage of values for $\nu$ and $\overline{\eta}$ may be an indication that there is no equilibrium in the loan market or that the loan market collapses such as in Becsi, Li, and Wang 2005.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>Discount rate</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$A$</td>
<td>Baseline Technology</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[\omega, \overline{\omega}]$</td>
<td>Support for idiosyncratic productivity</td>
<td>[0,1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta_p$</td>
<td>Calvo parameter for price setting</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta_w$</td>
<td>Calvo parameter for wage setting</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\epsilon_p$</td>
<td>Elasticity of substitution among final goods</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi$</td>
<td>Inverse of Frisch Elasticity</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta$</td>
<td>Firm’s Nash bargaining share</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\nu$</td>
<td>Matching function elasticity</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Parameters taken from the data and conventional values from the literature

- Calibrated technology parameters: The elasticity of labor and the scale parameter in the aggregate production function for intermediate goods $\alpha$ and $\xi^{pf}$ respectively as well as the fixed cost of producing the intermediate good $x^f$.

- Calibrated preference parameters: The preference shifter $\chi$ and the elasticity among labor types, $\epsilon_w$.

In the next table, we report the steady state targets that we use to calibrate the above subset of parameters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$U$</td>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N$</td>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Y^f$</td>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varphi(\hat{\omega})$</td>
<td>Overall continuation rate</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$cd$</td>
<td>Credit destruction rate</td>
<td>0.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varphi(\hat{\omega})^m x^f$</td>
<td>Fixed cost share of GDP</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\frac{uN}{Y^f}$</td>
<td>Labor share of GDP</td>
<td>$\frac{2}{3}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\frac{p\epsilon_p}{\phi}$</td>
<td>Loan to deposits ratio</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\frac{er}{d}$</td>
<td>Excess reserves to deposits ratio</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Steady state targets

Following Galí (2011) we target an unemployment rate of $U = 0.05$ and aggregate employment of $N = 0.59$ at the steady-state. Given this, equation SS3 above, implies an elasticity of substitution among labor types of $\epsilon_w = 4.2743$ which in turn is associated with an average wage markup of 30 percent. We assume a 35 percent share of the fixed cost of production in GDP, $FCS = 0.35$, similar to Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Trabandt (2015). The steady-state overall continuation rate for a credit relationship is set at 70 percent, $\varphi(\hat{\omega}) = 0.7$, which is consistent with findings reported in Chodorow-Reich (2014) for banking relationships in the U.S. syndicated loan market using a sample that covers 2001 to June 2009 excluding loans to borrowers in finance, insurance or real estate and for which the purpose of the loan is not working capital or general corporate production. Specifically, Chodorow-Reich (2014) finds that after controlling for a bank’s average market share, a bank that served as the prior lead lender for a private borrower has a 71 percent greater likelihood of serving as the new lead lender in the same loan contract. Given that the scale technology parameter, $\xi^{pf}$, is chosen in order to normalize the steady-state level of GDP to unity (i.e., $Y^f = 1$ in equation SS4), we can
solve for \( x^f \) to be consistent with the steady-state target imposed on the fixed cost share of GDP, which is given by

\[
\frac{\phi(\tilde{\omega}) f^m x^f}{Y^f} = 0.35
\]

We target a steady-state loan to deposit ratio of \( \frac{l}{d} = 0.63 \) by using quarterly data on commercial and industrial loans as well as saving deposits for all U.S commercial banks during the great moderation period which is taken as between 1985 and 2007. The steady-state target for the loan to deposit ratio \( \frac{l}{d} \), together with the steady-state target for \( \phi(\tilde{\omega}) \) explained above, allows us to obtain the steady-state level for the measure of firms in a credit relationship \( f^m \) by using the relationship between loans and deposits that arises when aggregating the balance sheet of those banks able to lend out their available funds to intermediate good producers. This condition at the steady-state is given by:

\[
\frac{l}{d} = \phi(\tilde{\omega}) f^m
\]

Clearly, equations SS9 and SS10 together with the specified steady-state targets for \( FCS, \phi(\tilde{\omega}), \frac{l}{d} \) and \( Y^f \) are consistent with \( f^m = 0.9 \) and \( x^f = 0.56 \). Therefore, the steady-state of the model implies that 90 percent of producing firms (intermediate good producers) are in a credit contract with a bank. The parameter \( x^f = 0.56 \) is consistent with a steady-state involving a 35 percent fixed cost of production share of GDP, a 70 percent probability of overall continuation for a credit relationship, and a 90 percent measure of firms in a credit relationship.

We target the labor share of GDP at the steady-state of \( LS = \frac{wN}{Y^f} = 2/3 \). The latter definition together with the equilibrium condition in the loan market evaluated at the steady state, \( l = wN \) yields a steady-state value for the real wage equal to \( w = 1.13 \) and aggregate real loans of \( l = 2/3 \). Then, given the steady-state target on the loan to deposit ratio, we obtain the steady-state value of aggregate real deposits to be \( d = 1.06 \). We use the average of all reserve balances with Federal Reserve banks during the great moderation period and the average of all saving deposits at U.S commercial banks during the same period of time in order to set the ratio of aggregate excess reserves to aggregate deposits to be 1.5 percent. The aggregate level of reserves consistent with the specified target is \( \frac{er}{d} = 0.015 \), and the steady state level of aggregate deposits obtained before is, \( er = 0.0159 \). The resource constraint of the economy implies consumption at the steady-state to be \( Y^f = C = 1 \) while the aggregate CIA constraint can be solved for the steady state level of real money balances \( m \) given our parametrization of \( R = 1.0101 \) and the steady state level of aggregate excess reserves that we have already obtained. Thus, at the steady-state, the supply of real money balances must be allocated to consumption and interest rate payments on excess reserves.
\[ m = C + (R) er \]  
(SS11)

with \( m = 1.016 \). The labor force equation evaluated at the steady-state implies:

\[ w = RC\chi(L) = \]  
(SS12)

given the parameterization of \( \chi \) and the steady-state values for \( w,C,R \) and \( L \) obtained above, we can solve consistently for the preference shift parameter to be \( \chi = 12.1074 \). Notice that the calibration of \( \chi \) is also consistent with the optimal price setting equation evaluated at the steady state, equation SS2 above, and therefore it is consistent with the steady-state level of employment we are targeting (\( N = 0.59 \)). The stochastic discount factor evaluated at the steady-state yields \( \Delta = \beta = 0.99 \).

The aggregate balance sheet of banks evaluated at the steady-state allows us to obtain the residual term as a fraction of deposits as \( \xi_{bs} = 1 - \frac{l}{d} - \frac{er}{d} = 0.3550 \)

Following Contessi and Francis (2013), we target an average quarterly credit destruction rate of 2.9 percent during the great moderation period. The credit destruction rate implied by the model and evaluated at the steady-state is

\[ cd = 0.029 = 1 - \varphi(\tilde{\omega}) - \mu r^\nu \delta \]  
(SS13)

Finally, the steady-state probability of continuation for a credit contract:

\[ \varphi(\tilde{\omega}) = (1 - \delta) \left( \frac{\overline{\omega} - \tilde{\omega}}{\overline{\omega} - \underline{\omega}} \right) \]  
(SS14)

Given the above targets and parameter calibrations, equations SS4-SS8 together with equations SS13 and SS14 can be solved for the following set of parameters \( \kappa, \mu, \delta, \xi^{pf}, \alpha \) and the corresponding steady-state values for \( \tilde{\omega} \), and \( \tau \) (See appendix C for the complete system of equations that characterize the steady-state).

The table below summarizes the calibrated parameters of the model solved to be consistent with the steady-state targets specified above.

The above results imply that \( k = \frac{2 - \alpha}{1 - \alpha} = 3.0409 \). The steady state values for some of the endogenous variables in the model are summarized in the following table:

### 4.3 Equilibrium dynamics: Monetary policy and financial shocks

We interpret the dynamic responses to different shocks focusing on two main equations. The optimal hiring rule for all active credit matches, given by:
Table 3: Calibrated parameters to be consistent with steady state targets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\kappa$</td>
<td>Bank search costs</td>
<td>0.6697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu$</td>
<td>Matching function scale parameter</td>
<td>1.0564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta$</td>
<td>Exogenous probability of separation</td>
<td>0.2029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\xi_{pf}$</td>
<td>Production function scale parameter</td>
<td>3.9482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$</td>
<td>Labor elasticity of production function</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\xi_{bs}$</td>
<td>Residual term on aggregate bank’s balance sheet</td>
<td>0.3550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^f$</td>
<td>Fixed cost of production</td>
<td>0.5556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi$</td>
<td>Preference parameter for dis-utility of labor</td>
<td>12.1074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\epsilon_w$</td>
<td>Elasticity of substitution among labor types</td>
<td>4.2743</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Steady state values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\Pi$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$\Pi^*$</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta^w$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$\Delta^p$</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Y^f_w$</td>
<td>1.4854</td>
<td>$Y^f_p$</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F$</td>
<td>0.2355</td>
<td>$C$</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$b^w$</td>
<td>0.2022</td>
<td>$m$</td>
<td>1.0160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$f$</td>
<td>0.2826</td>
<td>$R$</td>
<td>1.0101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p^w$</td>
<td>0.9554</td>
<td>$w$</td>
<td>1.1299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p^b$</td>
<td>1.3356</td>
<td>$\mu^p$</td>
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<tr>
<td>$U$</td>
<td>0.0500</td>
<td>$L$</td>
<td>0.6211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N$</td>
<td>0.5900</td>
<td>$\phi(\tilde{\omega})$</td>
<td>0.7000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$f^m$</td>
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<td>$\tilde{\omega}$</td>
<td>0.1218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$l$</td>
<td>0.6667</td>
<td>$d$</td>
<td>1.0582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau$</td>
<td>1.3980</td>
<td>$er$</td>
<td>0.0159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$$MPL_t(\omega_{z,t}) = MC_t; \quad \forall \omega_{z,t} > \tilde{\omega}_t$$ (96)

and the reservation productivity level written in terms of the real marginal cost $MC_t$ and credit market tightness $\tau_t$:

$$\tilde{\omega}_t = \frac{1}{\alpha^\alpha (1 - \alpha)^{1-\alpha}} \frac{(MC_t)^\alpha}{A_t} \left[ x^f - \frac{\kappa}{1 - \eta} (\mu \tau_t^{1-v} - \eta \mu \tau_t) \right]^{1-\alpha}$$ (97)

where the marginal product of labor is given by $MPL_t(\omega_{z,t}) = \alpha \xi_{pf} A_t(\omega_{z,t} N_t^*(\omega_{z,t})^{\alpha-1}$ and the Nash bargained marginal cost of labor expressed in terms of the intermediate good is $MC_t = \mu^p w_t R_t$.

Notice that the first equation is the result of the Nash bargaining protocol over the joint surplus generated by a credit contract. Therefore, conditional on surviving, each credit contract will determine the loan principal and hire workers consistent with the point where the marginal product of labor is equal to the Nash bargained real marginal cost of labor expressed in terms of the intermediate good. Changes in this equation generate an intensive margin effect since it holds only for those credit matches that have survived the exogenous as well as the endogenous separation hazards. In this case, the subset of surviving firms will modify their hiring decisions until equilibrium is restored.

The second equation is obtained by setting the joint surplus for a credit contract to zero. The reservation
productivity, $\tilde{\omega}_t$, that results in a productivity threshold that determines the subset of firms able to obtain funds, hire workers, and produce during the period. This threshold productivity generates an extensive margin effect whenever it responds to aggregate macroeconomic shocks. Notice that $\tilde{\omega}_t$ has two main determinants: $MC_t$ and $\tau_t$. In a partial equilibrium setting, an increase in $MC_t$ will raise the reservation productivity taking as given credit market tightness, $\tau_t$. By the same token, our benchmark calibration implies that holding $MC_t$ constant, an increase in $\tau_t$ will produce an increase in the reservation productivity. The main transmission mechanism of aggregate shocks in this economy goes through changes in $\tilde{\omega}_t$ which ultimately is a consequence of movements in the joint surplus of a credit match, $V_{JS}(\omega_{z,t})$. Fluctuations in $MC_t$ and $\tau_t$ affect $V_{JS}(\omega_{z,t})$: An increase in $MC_t$ holding $\tau_t$ constant reduces the joint surplus of an active credit contract while a tighter credit market (higher $\tau_t$), holding $MC_t$ constant will also end up reducing this joint surplus. General equilibrium effects will determine all the variables simultaneously.

4.3.1 Credit inefficiency wedge and labor productivity

Recall that, $F_t$ is the endogenous component of technology and that it depends on credit market conditions as well as on the reservation productivity level. This term is given by:

$$F_t = (1 - \delta_t) \left( \frac{(\omega)^k - (\tilde{\omega})^k}{k(\omega - \tilde{\omega})} \right) f_m t^{-1}$$

Throughout this section, we define the credit inefficiency wedge as the endogenous component of technology unrelated to employment, given by: $F_t^{1-\alpha}$. Notice that without credit market frictions, $F_t = 1$ and aggregate output in the intermediate sector would be: $Y_t^I = \xi pf A_t \left( \frac{N_t}{N_f} \right)^\alpha$. In this latter case, the only inefficiency that appears after aggregation is the one related to presence of wage rigidities. But, under the assumption of search and matching frictions in the loan market, the inefficiency wedge depends on the aggregate probability of continuation of a credit contract as well as on the mass of active credit contracts. Both of these features depend ultimately on the common reservation productivity threshold. Clearly in this model, credit conditions affect the inefficiency wedge, generating amplification effects to any aggregate shock hitting the economy.

On the other hand, labor productivity in the intermediate good sector is given by:

$$LP_t = \frac{Y_t^I}{N_t} = \frac{\xi pf A_t}{(\Delta n)^\alpha} \left( \frac{F_t}{N_t} \right)^{1-\alpha}$$

In our model, labor productivity is also affected by the credit wedge. If the loan market is a Walrasian centralized market then $F_t = 1$ and credit conditions do not affect labor productivity. Credit market frictions generate inefficient fluctuations in labor productivity, employment and intermediate output as well as final output driven by changes in the the probability of continuation of the credit contract and the set of actively
producing firms. This of course translates into inefficient fluctuations in the unemployment rate given the interaction of wage rigidities, market power, and the labor force participation condition that characterizes the labor market. Financial shocks are propagated and amplified by the endogenous response of this credit inefficiency wedge term.

We can define total factor productivity, $TFP_t$, as the terms in the aggregate production function in the intermediate good sector not associated with the labor input, that is:

$$TFP_t = \xi^{pl} A_t (F_t)^{1-\alpha}$$ (100)

The inefficiency associated with the presence of credit frictions also affects the evolution of total factor productivity. In our setting, TFP is affected by aggregate shocks through the inefficiency wedge. If $F_t = 1$ then TFP is exogenous. Therefore, total factor productivity is additionally subject to inefficient endogenous fluctuations that amplify and propagate aggregate shocks to the macroeconomy.\(^{19}\)

### 4.3.2 The effects of a monetary policy shock

Figures 7-10 present the equilibrium responses of several variables of interest to an expansionary monetary policy shock under the assumption that the central bank follows an exogenous money growth rule.\(^{20}\) An expansionary monetary policy shock corresponds to a 0.25 percent quarterly increase on impact in the rate of nominal money growth. On impact, the nominal interest rate increases slightly (20 basis points) since the model does not produce a liquidity effect given that we assume a CIA constraint and a logarithmic period utility function.

Monetary policy in our model is transmitted through the standard interest rate channel as well as through impacts on the intensive and extensive margin associated with the interaction among the working capital channel, search and matching frictions in the loan market, and the presence of a match-specific productivity level. The intensive margin works thorough the hiring decisions of surviving firms while the extensive margin is related to changes in the subset of active producing firms. The dynamics of both margins are reflected in the response of credit conditions measured by $\tau_t$ as well as on gross credit flows, the joint surplus of credit relationships and aggregate productivity.

The standard interest rate channel of monetary policy works through changes in the real interest rate (the real deposit rate). Although the nominal interest rate increases on impact, (see figure 9) it falls quickly below zero and remains negative for almost 10 quarters, due to the presence of nominal rigidities and their influence on inflation expectations. Two quarters after the monetary policy shock, deviations of the real interest rate with respect to its steady state are also negative resulting in an increase in employment, output,

\(^{19}\)This avenue for aggregate shocks to directly affect TFP through the credit inefficiency wedge is clear in Figure 24 and the discussion surrounding the impact of real frictions.

\(^{20}\)In appendix D we present results for a cashless economy version of the model that is closed with a Taylor rule.
and consumption.

The expansionary policy is also reinforced by the presence of credit frictions. Conditional on surviving, a credit contract requires the firm to equalize the marginal product of labor to the Nash bargained real marginal cost of labor, $MC_t$, which is expressed in terms of the intermediate good. An expansionary monetary policy shock lowers the Nash bargained marginal cost of hiring a new worker for all surviving producing firms primarily due to the observed decline in the price mark-up, $\mu_p^t$, and future negative deviations of the nominal deposit rate with respect to its steady state (see figure 8). This reduction in $MC_t$, generates an intensive margin effect: surviving active firms hire more workers at each wage rate because the cost of financing workers is cheaper, raising aggregate labor demand at each level of the average real wage, and thus employment and production for all active production units (the intensive margin effect of monetary policy).

As noted earlier, expansionary monetary policy does not generate a liquidity effect—this implies the nominal interest rate will increase initially. However the Nash bargained marginal cost of labor expressed in terms of the intermediate good will decrease because the price mark-up, $\mu_p^t$, exhibits a strong decline that overpowers the initial increase in $R_t$ as well as the hump-shaped increase in the real wage $w_t$. The increase in the real wage occurs due to the increase in aggregate labor demand but it is dampened by the presence of sticky wages; this feature is also present in the standard New Keynesian model with wage rigidities.

But there is additionally an extensive margin effect, (see figure 7), generated by the persistent decline of the reservation productivity, $\tilde{\omega}_t$, which (1) reduces the overall continuation rate for credit contracts, $\varphi_t(\tilde{\omega}_t)$ (2) increases the credit inefficiency wedge $F_t$, increasing credit frictions (explained below) (3) increases total factor and labor productivity: $TFP_t$ and $LP_t$. (4) reduces credit market tightness, $\tau_t$ (5) and thus expands the measure of firms able to get contracts with banks once matched thus increasing the overall demand for labor, employment, output, and consumption. Therefore, the expansionary monetary policy shock is transmitted directly through changes in the endogenous component of total factor productivity which reinforces the standard interest rate channel since credit conditions for firms are eased as the reduction in the Nash bargained marginal cost as well as in the measure of credit market tightness $\tau_t$ raises the joint surplus of a credit match, generating an even more persistent decline in $\tau_t$, the average interest rate spread, and the average loan interest rate.

The aggregation of both margin effects is summarized in the evolution of the credit inefficiency wedge. For monetary policy shocks, the intensive and extensive margin effects cause movements in the same direction of employment and output. As noted earlier, the expansion of real money balances also reduces the reservation productivity level for those credit matches generating non-negative joint surpluses. As a consequence, more firms are able to obtain external funds, hire workers and produce (the extensive margin effect of monetary policy shocks) so there will be fewer firms searching for external funds ($f_t$). Thus the firm finding rate, $p_f^t$, increases and credit market tightness declines. The interaction of monetary policy and credit frictions
together with heterogeneous productivity at the firm level, generate a very persistent increase in the credit inefficiency wedge $F_t$ and total factor productivity $TFP_t$ that lasts for approximately 16 quarters.

Note that analytically, as this wedge asymptotes to one, credit frictions decline. When $F(t) = 1$ there are no credit frictions and the remaining frictions are due to nominal rigidities. But in this case, deviations of $F(t)$ with respect to its steady-state are inefficient. The steady-state of the model implies a degree of credit frictions measured by $F$ and given by $F = 0.24$. Any deviation of $F(t)$ from its steady state level, positive or negative, raises the degree/extent of credit frictions.

Free entry of banks to the loan market implies more banks will enter following the shock, inducing a temporary increase in the measure of banks searching for projects/borrowers, $b_t^i$, thus decreasing the bank finding rate, $p_b$, on impact and for two subsequent quarters (see figure 7). As the reservation productivity, $\tilde{\omega}_t$, declines the overall continuation rate for credit contracts increases by almost 20 basis points on impact and remains persistently high for more than six quarters. Therefore credit conditions improve for currently active firms as well as for potential firms–those with profitable projects–as can be seen through the persistent decline in $\tau_t$ and corresponding increase in the measure of active credit contracts, $f_{tm}$ (see figure 7).

These new credit conditions translate into a persistent decline in the credit destruction rate as well as a persistent increase in the credit creation rate which together create a net increase in aggregate loans and deposits (see figures 8 and 9). The decline in credit destruction is larger and more persistent than the increase in credit creation on impact. This well-known feature of bank credit is generated by the relative ease with which banks can moderate their current contracts compared to negotiating new contracts. In our model, the increase in the continuation probability of credit contracts impacts credit destruction immediately while in order for new credit to be negotiated, banks need to enter. These features of the credit market are reflected in a persistent decline in the credit reallocation rate and a hump-shaped rise in excess reallocation. This result also implies that the observed increase in $TFP_t$ after an expansionary monetary policy shock is inefficient since it reflects the presence of credit frictions that end up amplifying the effects of a monetary policy shock.

The expansion in economic activity as well as the improved credit conditions in the loan market induce the central bank to automatically reduce its loans to the banking sector–this is in part a result of our modeling assumptions for the banking sector, where banks receive loans from the central bank to cover deposit interest if they are unable to lend. In this model, central bank lending to the banking sector corresponds to excess reserves, $er_t$, that banks hold with the central bank. The decline in $er_t$ (see figure 9) is a consequence of the increase in the overall continuation rate of credit contracts and the free entry of banks into the loan market. Also, the observed decline in the price mark-up, $\mu_t^P$, produces an increase in the inflation rate which is consistent with the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in New Keynesian models.

Nominal price and wage rigidities additionally contribute to the persistent decline in the unemployment rate and the overall expansionary effect of the shock on aggregate macroeconomic variables (consumption,
4.3.3 The effects of a financial shock

Figures 11-14 illustrate the dynamic responses of the credit market, labor market, and other aggregate variables to a negative (i.e., bad) financial shock, defined as an unexpected persistent increase in the exogenous separation rate for credit contracts, $\delta_t$. The overall continuation rate of a credit contract is defined as $\varphi_t(\hat{\omega}_t) = (1 - \delta_t)(1 - \gamma_t(\hat{\omega}_t))$ where its exogenous component $\delta_t$ follows the following AR(1) process:

$$\delta_t - \delta = \rho_\delta (\delta_{t-1} - \delta) + \varepsilon^\delta_t$$  \hspace{1cm} (101)

Our calibration procedure is consistent with a steady-state value for $\delta$ of 0.2029. We assume a very persistent financial shock with $\rho_\delta = 0.9$.

The financial shock results in the exogenous termination of a fraction of existing credit contracts due to the decline in the overall continuation rate of credit relationships. The impact of such an increase in the separation rate qualitatively matches the impact of a rise in the excess bond premium in our VAR results discussed in the motivation section above. After a negative financial shock, there is an increase in the number of intermediate good producers searching for funds, $f_t$, and a larger number of banks searching for profitable projects to fund, denoted by $b^u_t$. From the perspective of a bank, the expected value of searching for a project/borrower turns out to be temporally negative following a negative financial shock, inducing banks to exit the loan market until the expected value of searching for borrowers increases. Since banks are able to exit the loan market, the measure of firms searching for funds will be larger than the measure of banks searching for borrowers, inducing an increase in credit market tightness, $\tau_t$. Moreover, intermediate good producers separated from their previous credit contract are not able to exit the market as is the case for banks, but must continue searching in order to attempt production in the future. These two conditions cause credit market conditions to tighten from the perspective of borrowers, exhibited by a decline in the firm’s finding rate, $p^f_t$ (see figures 11 - 14). The bank’s finding rate, $p^b_t$ increases since banks exit the market when the surplus from looking for firms becomes negative. When banks are separated and exit the loan market, the central bank must automatically increase excess reserves, $er_t$, to compensate for the fact that banks have no remaining assets to pay interest on households’ deposits.

The transmission of the financial shock is further reinforced by a decline in the joint surplus to a credit match which is a consequence of the large persistent increase in the reservation productivity level $\hat{\omega}_t$. The mass of firms and banks beginning the period in a credit contract and which survive the exogenous financial shock must raise their reservation productivity threshold due to the decline in the joint surplus of a credit relationship and the consequent tighter credit market (higher $\tau_t$). The increase in reservation productivity induces an even more pronounced and persistent fall in the overall continuation rate, $\varphi_t(\hat{\omega}_t)$, adding to that
generated by the initial shock to the exogenous separation rate, $\delta_t$. The dynamics associated with the increase in the reservation productivity level produce an extensive margin effect–this is a selection effect that reduces the subset of firms able to obtain external funds, hire workers, and produce. The tighter credit conditions are also reflected in a persistent decline of the mass of firms engaged in a credit contract, $f_{mt-1}$ and a significant reduction on the aggregate amount of loans, $l_t$. These new credit conditions translate to a persistent increase in the average interest rate spread (over the deposit rate) as well as an increase in the average loan rate (see figure 11).

However, the financial shock also generates an intensive margin effect that partially off-sets the extensive margin effect. This intensive margin effect is related to those credit contracts -firm and bank pairs- that survive the financial shock but adjust their existing loan contract by changing the conditions characterizing their bilateral bargaining protocol. Specifically, a financial shock reduces the Nash bargained marginal cost of labor expressed in terms of the intermediate good, $MC_t$ for all active intermediate good producers, inducing a small recovery in aggregate labor demand–demand from firms who remain in active credit contracts–but which is not sufficient to offset the much larger negative extensive margin effect of the financial shock (see figure 12). The persistent decline on the average real wage is indicative of the much larger negative extensive margin effect on labor demand in relationship to the smaller intensive margin effect.

For the labor market, a negative financial shock generates a sharp and prolonged decline in employment and total factor productivity (see figure 14) and a large increase in the unemployment rate. These responses are shaped by the sum of the intensive and extensive margin effects described above. The steep and persistent declines in labor productivity are due to the fact output falls by more than employment and both labor and total factor productivity are negatively effected by the increase in credit inefficiency (decline in $F(t)$) due to the tightening of the credit market. The large and persistent increase in the unemployment rate is explained by the interaction between wage rigidities and the search and matching frictions of the loan market; as the credit market tightens, fewer firms are able to produce putting downward pressure on employment. Nominal wages are slow to adjust to the new environment, further reducing the demand for labor. The reduction in the demand for labor results in lower aggregate output.

In the credit market, aggregate loans decline and deposits increase. Excess reserves must increase by more than deposits to balance the money market since banks who exit or whose contracts separate have no funds to pay interest on deposits. The resulting tighter conditions in the lending market are reflected in the response of gross credit flows. After a negative financial shock, the credit creation rate decreases persistently while the credit destruction rate increases. Both responses imply a persistent decline in the credit reallocation rate.

Considering the impact on prices of an exogenous increase in the credit separation rate, we find a decline in the inflation rate associated with an increase in the price mark-up, $\mu^p_t$. The real supply of money increases

\footnote{This is unlike the case of a monetary policy shock where the intensive and extensive margin effects work in the same direction.}
causing the nominal interest rate to fall below zero for the first two quarters. Following this period, the fall in real money demand (proxied by the fall in consumption) more than compensates for the increase in the real money supply and thus the nominal interest rate rises.

4.4 Determining role of real (credit frictions) and nominal frictions

4.4.1 The role of nominal frictions

We consider the role of nominal rigidities in shaping the economy’s response to financial and monetary policy shocks given frictions in lending markets. For an expansionary monetary policy shock (Figures 15-18), wage and/or price flexibility reduces the effectiveness of monetary policy under credit frictions. The Nash bargained marginal cost of labor does not fall much under flexible wages following a reduction in the deposit rate; in fact it rises if there are no nominal rigidities so unemployment does not decline and any increase in employment is due to an increase in labor force participation caused by the increase in the real wage under the case where wages are flexible but prices are rigid.

In figures 19-22 we show the impulse response functions for the aggregate response to a financial shock for three cases: our originally reported case (benchmark) with nominal wage and price frictions in addition to credit market search frictions (blue), the case of flexible wages, sticky prices, and credit market search frictions (black), the case of flexible prices, wages, and credit market search frictions (red). Since we model unemployment via assumptions that wages are slow to adjust and individuals have variable labor market participation, our model cannot generate unemployment once we deviate from the sticky wage assumption.

The results suggest that sticky prices and wages are crucial for obtaining a strong and persistent response in credit markets to a financial shock. Under wage flexibility (red or black lines in the figures), a financial shock produces a persistent recession that is reflected only in GDP, consumption, and total factor productivity but that is only weakly reflected in credit market tightness, interest rates and credit destruction. The responses of GDP and consumption are similar under sticky wages and flexible prices as they are under fully flexible prices and wages. The credit search frictions on their own generate about half of the initial decline in consumption and GDP as the case with both search frictions and wage/price rigidity. The search frictions still generate a sizeable amount of persistence with full recovery of consumption and GDP requiring more than 16 quarters.

The biggest impact of nominal rigidities occurs in the labor market. Obviously without wage rigidity, there is no increase in unemployment. The very small decline in employment under sticky prices and flexible wages is generated by a decline in labor force participation rather than an increase in unemployment. When prices or wages are flexible, the Nash bargained real marginal costs and the real wage adjust more to the shock, reducing any impact on the labor market. Since lending declines there is less production overall but the decline in lending does not affect the reservation productivity level but rather the bargaining over loan size and interest rate between the bank and firm.
Because the credit frictions remain in all three cases, total factor productivity declines by the same amount on impact with and without wage rigidities. This is due to the credit inefficiency wedge, \( F_t \) in 
\[
TFP_t = \xi_t \Lambda_t (F_t)^{1-\alpha}.
\]
The decline in TFP is persistent even without nominal rigidities but the decline in TFP is larger with wage rigidities due to the direct influence of wage setting behavior on labor productivity. After a financial shock, the fall in the marginal cost of labor is more pronounced in the case of wage and price stickiness. Therefore, the intensive margin effect, which offsets the extensive-margin-reduction in matched firm-bank pairs, is stronger in the case of price and/or wage flexibility as wages and prices are able to adjust downward. In this case, the fall in the marginal cost of labor entirely offsets the reduction in employment due to the reduction in firms receiving loans causing no change in unemployment.

### 4.4.2 The role of real frictions

We next consider the role credit frictions play in the response of the economy to monetary policy and total factor productivity shocks. To do this, we compare the case with credit frictions turned off, with nominal frictions remaining, to the case with credit frictions turned on. When credit frictions are turned off, banks and firms meet in a Walrasian market where loan prices and quantities are determined. The resulting model is effectively a standard cash-in-advance New Keynesian model with nominal rigidities and a cost channel but no real (credit) frictions. To compare the response of the economy in each case and isolate the impact credit frictions produce on the amplitude and persistence of the responses, we consider two experiments, an expansionary monetary policy shock and an expansionary total factor productivity shock. Since there are no credit frictions in our comparative analysis, we cannot look at financial shocks in the same way constructed previously where a financial shock was modeled as a shock to the probability of exogenous separation. Thus to gain more information on the role credit frictions are playing in the economy’s responses, we consider TFP shocks here.\(^{22}\)

The results are reported in figures 23-24 for the monetary policy shock and in figures 25-26 for the TFP shock where the results with lending frictions (baseline) are blue and those with perfect competitive lending markets (no search frictions) are red. Overall, the results suggest that lending frictions work as an amplification and propagation mechanism for both types of shocks in terms of the aggregate response particularly of consumption and GDP. This result is similar to the financial accelerator literature, for example, Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) among others, since frictional lending markets endogenously amplify and propagate shocks to the economy.

Under lending frictions, expansionary monetary policy is transmitted through the standard interest rate channel together with an extensive and intensive margin that reinforce each other as noted in our discussion in section 4.3.2. In the case of perfect competitive lending markets, there is no extensive margin effect following

\(^{22}\)Results for model responses to TFP shocks under varying nominal frictions are available from the authors.
a monetary policy shock since all firms looking for credit receive it and the allocation occurs through loan rates and quantities. The intensive margin (the number of workers hired or output produced by the firms that are producing) is still active because of the existence of a working capital channel–intermediate firms must still finance their labor prior to production–but it is weaker under this specification as the smaller decline of the real marginal cost of labor indicates. Notice that without credit frictions, all producing firms are active since all of them (a mass of one) are able to obtain funding, but aggregate loans and the nominal interest rate are less responsive to the monetary policy shocks than in the case with credit frictions. The dampened movement in aggregate lending is a consequence of the absence of an endogenous response of the credit separation rate that ultimately depends on the cut-off idiosyncratic productivity under friction-less lending markets.

By the same token, there is no endogenous response of TFP following a monetary policy shock with competitive lending markets, resulting in a smaller and less persistent response overall. The responses to a monetary policy shock of all macroeconomic aggregates, by contrast, are amplified and more protracted when lending markets are characterized by search and matching frictions (blue lines in figure 24). Thus credit frictions in a model with nominal rigidities, play a significant role in amplifying the effects of monetary policy and propagating it through the endogenous response of TFP and gross credit flows. In the model with credit frictions, total factor productivity is impacted by a term, $F(t)$, which measures the inefficiency of credit allocation. As discussed above, deviations of $F(t)$ from its steady state level represent increases in inefficiency. Since expansionary monetary policy causes the credit inefficiency wedge, $F(t)$, to increase, monetary policy generates an increase in TFP thus amplifying the effect of monetary policy on GDP, consumption, and employment variables. The increase in TFP under frictional credit markets is inefficient relative to the competitive lending market case.

Considering an expansionary total factor productivity shock (shock to $A_t$) in figures 25 and 26, we find that under lending frictions, the effects of the shock are larger and more persistent than without lending frictions.

The exogenous technology shock is also propagated through intensive and extensive margin effects because the credit inefficiency wedge is operative in the TFP equation. The endogenous response of TFP under frictional lending markets reinforces the initial exogenous shock in TFP. Under competitive lending markets, by contrast, TFP is exogenous and the initial shock is not amplified by further increases in TFP. Under frictional lending markets, the intensive effect is generated by a persistent increase in the Nash bargained marginal cost of labor which reduces the number of workers hired by firms while the extensive margin effect occurs because more firms receive financing as the productivity threshold for lending falls leading to an increase in aggregate lending, after a decline on impact due to the shift in aggregate productivity. Although real marginal costs rise in both cases, real wages rise more in the case with lending frictions as does aggregate
lending. Since more firms receive funding after the initial shock, total factor productivity continues to rise for two periods after the shock as the credit inefficiency wage increases. This means employment declines by less in the credit frictions case and it recovers faster. GDP and consumption also experience a much larger increase following the productivity shock due to the propagating effect of credit frictions caused by the endogenous rise in total factor productivity. Under lending frictions, the amplification effect of the exogenous increase in TFP is reflected in responses of gross credit flows: Credit creation increases and credit destruction declines. In short, TFP shocks have larger and more prolonged effects when search and matching frictions characterize the lending market through changes in the credit inefficiency wedge and the threshold productivity cut-off.

5 Conclusion

The Great Recession and slow recovery was characterized by high and persistent unemployment and a decline in overall bank lending. The net decline in bank lending across all loan types was a novel feature of the Great Recession as it had not occurred in any previous post-Volker recession. These characteristics of the recession are suggestive of a relationship between bank credit and unemployment. We link credit flows to output and employment indirectly through search and matching frictions in the market for credit, embedded in an otherwise standard New Keynesian framework with wage and pricing frictions. We allow for endogenous credit destruction which then permits us to calculate movements in gross credit flows and match them to empirical credit behavior. Our model generates a ‘credit inefficiency wedge’ that arises as the endogenous component of aggregate technology unrelated to employment and acts like a productivity wedge. In the presence of credit frictions the inefficiency wedge depends on the aggregate probability that credit contracts are not broken as well as on the number of active firms. Both of these factors depend ultimately on the reservation productivity threshold that separates producing from non-producing firms. Thus, in our model, credit tightness serves to amplify the effects of financial and monetary shocks on employment and output through the inefficiency wedge.

As noted by Galí (2011) and discussed extensively in relationship to the volatility puzzle, quantitatively realistic labor market frictions are unlikely to have a large effect on output, employment, and productivity—a result we also find for credit market frictions in the absence of nominal rigidities. But we find, as Galí suggests for labor market frictions, that credit market frictions provide a mechanism for wage and price rigidities to play a role in the propagation and persistence of financial and monetary policy shocks. On their own, credit frictions create significant persistence in lost output and a significant decline in credit creation as well as a smaller persistent decline in total factor productivity.

Although our paper provides an important step in understanding the way in which links between credit tightness and employment exacerbate financial shocks and impact the effectiveness of monetary policy, there
are several ways in which we could extend it to capture additional features of the economy. The first is to implement a more realistic monetary policy rule, such as a Taylor rule instead of our simple money growth rule. Secondly, we could consider the case where the firm is able to default on repayment of its loans. Undoubtedly part of the reluctance of banks to lend was related to increases in default risk that accompanied the Great Recession. Firm heterogeneity in terms of size or age is also an important factor to consider when studying the mechanisms involved in the propagation of financial and monetary policy shocks. These issues are left for future work.

6 Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Raoul Minetti, Bart Moore, Marco Ortiz, and Carl Walsh for insightful comments on our paper. We also thank seminar participants at the 2015 BCRP (Central Reserve Bank of Peru) annual conference, the Seventh BIS CCA Research Conference in Lima, Peru, the 2016 MidWest Macro Meetings at Purdue University, the 2016 Peruvian Economic Association conference and research seminars at the Central Bank of Peru, Fordham University and UCSC for thoughtful commentary. This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

References


# Appendix A: Tables and Figures

Table 5: Descriptive statistics for credit and employment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>1973Q1-2012Q4</th>
<th>1984Q1-2007Q2</th>
<th>2007q3-2009q2</th>
<th>2009q3-2012q4</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total loan creation</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td>1.13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total loan destruction</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>0.73</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sum total lending</td>
<td>5.37</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>5.95</td>
<td>1.10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Net total lending</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>1.55</td>
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<td>1.65</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>1.37</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
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<td>1.60</td>
<td>5.71</td>
<td>1.05</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average labor productivity</td>
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<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.55</td>
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<tr>
<td>Job creation</td>
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<td>Sum JC + JD</td>
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<td>1.54</td>
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<td>Exc job creation</td>
<td>9.24</td>
<td>1.42</td>
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</table>

Note: Lending data is based on Reports of Income and Condition and calculations provided in Contessi, DiCecio, and Francis (2015). Job flows data are taken from Faberman (2012) and updated with the 2012 Business Employment Dynamics Survey. The means and standard deviations of creation or destruction of credit or jobs are expressed in rates. The unemployment rate is seasonally adjusted and downloaded from the FRED data repository at the Federal Reserve, St Louis. Average Labor productivity is calculated from real GDP (seasonally adjusted) and hours of non-farm business employees. These data are also downloaded from FRED.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>1973q1-2012q4</th>
<th>1984Q1-2007Q2</th>
<th>2007q3-2009q2</th>
<th>2009q3-2012q4</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\sigma/\sigma_{rgdp}$</td>
<td>$\rho(., rgdp)$</td>
<td>$\sigma/\sigma_{rgdp}$</td>
<td>$\rho(., rgdp)$</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>$\rho(., unemp)$</td>
<td>$\sigma/\sigma_{unemp}$</td>
<td>$\rho(., unemp)$</td>
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<td>Job creation</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job destruction</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td><strong>0.41</strong></td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td><strong>0.32</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum JC + JD</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td><strong>0.56</strong></td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td><strong>0.32</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>–</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>–</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
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<td>94</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: Lending data is based on Reports of Income and Condition and calculations provided in Contessi, DiCecio, and Francis (2015). Job flows data are taken from Faberman (2012) and updated with the 2012 Business Employment Dynamics Survey. Standard deviations and correlations are calculated using the cyclical component of the HP-filtered log-level of the variable. Boldface numbers indicate statistical significance at the 5% confidence level or better. Unemployment and RGDP are the HP filtered cyclical components of the log series of the unemployment rate and seasonally adjusted real GDP respectively.
Figure 1: Net credit flows: Commercial lending

In percent; quarters from trough (located at 0). Net credit creation in commercial and industrial lending. Net credit creation is seasonally adjusted and smoothed with a moving average process. Authors’ calculations based on Reports of Income and Condition.
Figure 2: Credit flows and reallocation: Commercial lending

Top row: credit creation (NBER dated recession trough is at mean equal to 3 percent) and credit destruction (trough is at mean equal to 4 percent) in commercial and industrial lending. Bottom row: credit reallocation (which equals the sum of credit creation and destruction; trough is at mean equal to 7 percent) and excess credit reallocation (which equals the sum of credit creation and destruction less the absolute value of net credit creation; trough is at mean equal to -1 percent). All data are reported in percent, seasonally adjusted and smoothed with a moving average process. Authors’ calculations based on Reports of Income and Condition.
Figure 3: Net job creation last two recessions

In percent; quarters from trough (located at 0). Net job creation in manufacturing. Authors’ calculations based on data from Faberman (2012) and updated with recent Business Employment Dynamics data from the U.S. Census.
Top row, from left, Total Factor Productivity (Based on data from Fernald (2012) update downloaded from http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/indicators-data/total-factor-productivity-tp/. Annual percentage change reported for business sector TFP.) and seasonally adjusted quarterly average labor productivity filtered with a Baxter King filter. Bottom row, from left, detrended logged seasonally adjusted quarterly real GDP and the unemployment rate. All data from the Federal Reserve, St Louis FRED data repository except for TFP as noted.

Figure 5: Conditional responses to a financial (EBP) shock
Figure 6: Conditional responses to a financial (EBP) shock
Figure 7: Model responses to a monetary policy shock, panel 1
Figure 8: Model responses to a monetary policy shock, panel 2

- Real marginal cost
- Nominal interest rate
- Real wage
- Price mark-up
- Credit creation rate
- Credit destruction rate
- Credit reallocation rate
- Excess reallocation rate
Figure 9: Model responses to a monetary policy shock, panel 3
Figure 10: Model responses to a monetary policy shock, panel 4
Figure 11: Model responses to a financial shock, panel 1
Figure 12: Model responses to a financial shock, panel 2
Figure 13: Model responses to a financial shock, panel 3

- **Average interest rate spread**
- **Average loan interest rate**
- **Gross nominal rate**
- **Real interest rate**
- **Aggregate loans**
- **Net credit creation**
- **Aggregate deposits**
- **Real excess reserves**
Figure 14: Model responses to a financial shock, panel 4
Figure 15: Model responses to a monetary policy shock: The role of nominal rigidities, panel 1
Figure 16: Model responses to a monetary policy shock: The role of nominal rigidities, panel 2

Real marginal cost

Nominal interest rate

Real wage

Price mark-up

Credit creation rate

Credit destruction rate

Credit reallocation rate

Excess reallocation rate
Figure 17: Model responses to a monetary policy shock: The role of nominal rigidities, panel 3
Figure 18: Model responses to a monetary policy shock: The role of nominal rigidities, panel 4
Figure 19: Model responses to a financial shock: The role of nominal rigidities, panel 1
Figure 20: Model responses to a financial shock: The role of nominal rigidities, panel 2
Figure 21: Model responses to a financial shock: The role of nominal rigidities, panel 3
Figure 22: Model responses to a financial shock: The role of nominal rigidities, panel 4

- **Total factor productivity**
- **Unemployment rate**
- **Employment**
- **Labor force**
- **GDP**
- **Consumption**
- **Real money balances**
- **Inflation rate**
Figure 23: Model responses to a monetary policy shock: The role of credit frictions, panel 1
Figure 24: Model responses to a monetary policy shock: The role of credit frictions, panel 2
Figure 25: Model responses to a TFP shock: The role of credit frictions, panel 1
Figure 26: Model responses to a TFP shock: The role of credit frictions, panel 2
8 Appendix B: Data sources

The macroeconomic data used in our analysis is available from public sources. Real GDP \( Y \), the GDP deflator, the measure of employment (which is defined as the log of workers in the non-farm business sector and denoted by \( \ln N \)), average labor productivity calculated as \( \ln \frac{Y}{N} \), the unemployment rate and the federal funds rate \( FFR \), are all downloaded from the FRED repository at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Quarterly gross job flows from 1992-2012 are downloaded from the Business Economic Dynamics database maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and augmented with historical data (1980-1991) from Faberman (2012).
Appendix C: Technical details

9.1 Value functions for intermediate good producers

The value function for a producing intermediate good firm during period $t$ is

$$V_{t+1}^{FP}(\omega_{z,t}) = \pi_t V_{t+1}^{FN} + (1 - \pi_t) \int_\omega \max(V_{t+1}^{FP}(\omega_{z,t+1}), V_{t+1}^{FN}) dG(\omega)$$

(102)

The value of producing is the flow value of current real profits plus the expected continuation value. At the end of the period, the credit relationship is exogenously dissolved with probability $\delta_t$, and the firm must seek new financing. With probability $(1 - \delta_t)$, the firm survives the exogenous separation hazard. In the latter case, only those firms receiving an idiosyncratic productivity realization $\omega_{z,t+1} \geq \tilde{\omega}_{t+1}$ will remain matched and produce during next period. Firms with $\omega_{z,t+1} < \tilde{\omega}_{t+1}$ endogenously separate from their bank and obtain $V_{t+1}^{FN}$.

The value of searching for external funds at date $t$ is

$$V_t^{FN} = p_t^{f} E_t \Delta_{t,t+1} \left[ \delta_t V_{t+1}^{FN} + (1 - \delta_t) \int_\omega \max(V_{t+1}^{FP}(\omega_{z,t+1}), V_{t+1}^{FN}) dG(\omega) \right] + (1 - p_t^{f}) V_{t+1}^{FN}$$

(103)

where $p_t^{f}$ is the probability of matching with a bank. Notice that we assume matches made in period $t$ do not produce until $t + 1$. With probability $(1 - p_t^{f})$, the firm does not match and must continue searching for external funds during next period’s loan market.

Under Nash bargaining, the reservation productivity level $\tilde{\omega}_t$ that triggers endogenous separation is determined by the point at which the joint surplus of the match is equal to zero. The probability of endogenous separation is

$$\gamma_{t+1}(\tilde{\omega}_{t+1}) = G(\tilde{\omega}_{t+1}) = \text{prob} (\omega_{z,t+1} \leq \tilde{\omega}_{t+1}).$$

Given the existence and uniqueness of $\tilde{\omega}_{t+1}$, the integral term on the expected continuation value is

$$\int_\omega \max(V_{t+1}^{FP}(\omega_{z,t+1}), V_{t+1}^{FN}) dG(\omega) = \gamma_{t+1} V_{t+1}^{FN} + (1 - \gamma_{t+1}(\tilde{\omega}_{t+1})) \int_{\tilde{\omega}_{t+1}}^{\omega} V_{t+1}^{FP}(\omega_{z,t+1}) \frac{dG(\omega)}{1 - \gamma_{t+1}(\tilde{\omega}_{t+1})}.$$  

(104)

Therefore, the firm value functions can be written as
\[ V_t^{FP}(\omega_{z,t}) = \pi_t^f(\omega_{z,t}) + E_t \Delta_{t,t+1} \left\{ (1 - \varphi_t(\tilde{\omega}_{t+1})) V_{t+1}^{FP} + \varphi_t(\tilde{\omega}_{t+1}) \int_{\tilde{\omega}_{t+1}}^\infty \frac{dG(\omega)}{1 - \gamma_{t+1}(\tilde{\omega}_{t+1})} \right\} \]

and

\[ V_t^{FN} = E_t \Delta_{t,t+1} \left\{ p_t^f \left( (1 - \varphi_t(\tilde{\omega}_{t+1})) V_{t+1}^{FN} + \varphi_t(\tilde{\omega}_{t+1}) \int_{\tilde{\omega}_{t+1}}^\infty \frac{dG(\omega)}{1 - \gamma_{t+1}(\tilde{\omega}_{t+1})} \right) + (1 - p_t^f) V_{t+1}^{FN} \right\} \tag{105} \]

Let the surplus to a producing firm be defined as \( V_t^{FS}(\omega_{z,t}) = V_t^{FP}(\omega_{z,t}) - V_t^{FN} \), then the intermediate producer surplus of being in a credit relationship can be written as

\[ V_t^{FS}(\omega_{z,t}) = \pi_t^f(\omega_{z,t}) + (1 - p_t^f) E_t \Delta_{t,t+1} \varphi_t(\tilde{\omega}_{t+1}) \int_{\tilde{\omega}_{t+1}}^\infty \frac{dG(\omega)}{1 - \gamma_{t+1}(\tilde{\omega}_{t+1})} \tag{106} \]

**Characterizing loan market equilibrium**  Partial equilibrium in the loan market can be characterized by a system of two equations in two unknowns: credit market tightness \( \tau_t \) and the reservation productivity level \( \tilde{\omega}_t \). The evolution of credit market tightness is obtained by using the free entry condition, the Nash bargaining sharing rule, and the definition of the joint surplus of a credit relationship, and it is given by the following equation:

\[ \frac{\kappa}{\mu_t^p \mu_t^\nu} - E_t \Delta_{t,t+1} \varphi_{t+1}(\tilde{\omega}_{t+1}) \left( 1 - \eta \mu_t^{\nu-1} \right) \frac{\kappa}{\mu_t^p \mu_t^{\nu-1}} = (1 - \eta) E_t \Delta_{t,t+1} \frac{1}{\mu_t^{\nu-1}} \left( 1 - \alpha \right) \frac{Y_{t+1}}{f_t} - \varphi_{t+1}(\tilde{\omega}_{t+1}) x^f \]  \tag{107} 

The second equation is given by the optimal reservation productivity level, \( \tilde{\omega}_t \) written as a function of \( \tau_t \):

\[ \left[ \alpha^\alpha (1 - \alpha)^{1-\alpha} \xi^p A_i \tilde{\omega}_t \right]^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} = (\mu_t^p w_t R_t) \frac{1}{\alpha} \left[ x^f - \left( 1 - \eta \mu_t^{\nu-1} \right) \frac{\kappa}{\mu_t^{\nu-1}} \right] \tag{108} \]

At the steady state, the equations for \( \tau_t \) and \( \tilde{\omega}_t \) become

\[ \kappa \left( 1 - \beta \varphi(\tilde{\omega}) \left( 1 - \eta \mu \tau^{\nu-1} \right) \right) = \mu \tau^{\nu} \left( 1 - \eta \right) \beta \left( 1 - \alpha \right) \frac{Y_{t+1}}{f_t} - \varphi(\tilde{\omega}) x^f \]  \tag{109} 

and

\[ \left[ \alpha^\alpha (1 - \alpha)^{1-\alpha} \xi^p A \tilde{\omega} \right]^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} = (\mu^p w R) \frac{1}{\alpha} \left[ x^f - \frac{\kappa}{1 - \eta} \left( 1 - \eta \mu^{\nu-1} \right) \right] \]  \tag{110} 

respectively.
9.2 Summarizing the non-linear equilibrium conditions

The system of non-linear equations that characterize the aggregate equilibrium of the model economy is:

- **Monetary policy:**

- **Money growth rule:**

  \[ m_t = \left(1 + \theta_t \right) \frac{\Pi_t}{\Pi_t} m_{t-1} \]  
  \[ \text{where} \]
  \[ \theta_t - \theta^{ss} = \rho (\theta_{t-1} - \theta^{ss}) + \xi_t \]  

- **Euler equation:**

  \[ \frac{1}{C_t} = \beta E_t \left\{ \left( \frac{R_t}{\Pi_{t+1}} \right) \frac{1}{C_{t+1}} \right\} \]  

- **CIA constraint:**

  \[ C_t = m_t - R_t r_t \]  

- **Wage setting equation:**

  \[ f_{1,t} = \left( \frac{\varepsilon_w}{\varepsilon_w - 1} \right) f_{2,t} \]  
  \[ f_{1,t} = \left( \frac{w_t^*}{w_t} \right)^{1-\varepsilon_w} \left( \frac{w_t}{\Pi_t} \right)^{\varepsilon_w} \]  
  \[ \left( \frac{N_t}{\Delta_t^w} \right)^{(1+\varphi)} \]  
  \[ + \beta \theta_w E_t \left( \frac{1}{\Pi_{t+1}} \right)^{1-\varepsilon_w} \left( \frac{w_t^*}{w_{t+1}} \right)^{1-\varepsilon_w} f_{1,t+1} \]  
  \[ f_{2,t} = \chi_t \left( \frac{w_t^*}{w_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon_w (1+\varphi)} \left( \frac{N_t}{\Delta_t^w} \right)^{(1+\varphi)} \]  
  \[ + (\beta \theta_w) E_t \left( \frac{1}{\Pi_{t+1}} \right)^{-\varepsilon_w (1+\varphi)} \left( \frac{w_t^*}{w_{t+1}} \right)^{-\varepsilon_w (1+\varphi)} f_{2,t+1} \]  

- **Aggregate wage index in real terms:**

  \[ 1 = \theta_w \left( \frac{w_{t-1}}{w_t} \right)^{1-\varepsilon_w} + (1 - \theta_w) \left( \frac{w_t^*}{w_t} \right)^{1-\varepsilon_w} \]  

- **Wage dispersion:**

  \[ \Delta_t^w = \theta_w \left( \frac{w_{t-1}}{w_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon_w} \Delta_{t-1}^w + (1 - \theta_w) \left( \frac{w_t^*}{w_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon_w} \]  

- **Price setting equation:**

  \[ g_{1,t} = \beta C_t \Pi_t^* + \theta_p E_t \left( \frac{\Pi_t^*}{\Pi_{t+1}} \right) g_{1,t+1} \]  
  \[ g_{2,t} = \beta \frac{1}{\mu_t} C_t + \theta_p E_t g_{2,t+1} \]  
  \[ g_{1,t} = \left( \frac{\varepsilon_p}{\varepsilon_p - 1} \right) g_{2,t} \]
• **Aggregate price index in terms of inflation rates:**

\[
1 = \theta_p \left( \frac{1}{\Pi_t} \right)^{1-\epsilon_p} + (1 - \theta_p) (\Pi_t^*)^{1-\epsilon_p}
\]  

(D12)

• **Price dispersion:**

\[
\Delta_t^P = \theta_p \left( \frac{1}{\Pi_t} \right)^{-\epsilon_p} \Delta_{t-1}^P + (1 - \theta_p) (\Pi_t^*)^{-\epsilon_p}
\]  

(D13)

• **Unemployment:**

\[
U_t = 1 - \frac{N_t}{L_t}
\]  

(D14)

• **Aggregate labor supply:**

\[
w_t = R_t C_t \chi_t (L_t)^{\varphi}
\]  

(D15)

• **Resource constraint:**

\[
\Delta_t^r C_t = Y_t^f
\]  

(D16)

• **Aggregate final good:**

\[
Y_t^f = Y_t^l - \left( b\iota \kappa + \varphi_t (\tilde{\omega}_t) f_t^m x_t^f \right)
\]  

(D17)

• **Aggregate bank’s balance sheet:**

\[
l_t + \epsilon r_t + \xi = d_t
\]  

(D18)

• **Consistency of aggregate loans and deposits:**

\[
l_t = \varphi_t (\tilde{\omega}_t) f_t^m d_t
\]  

(D19)

• **Aggregate equilibrium in the loan market:**

\[
l_t = \frac{w_t N_t}{\Delta_t^w}
\]  

(D20)

• **Aggregate production function for the intermediate good sector:**

\[
Y_t^I = A_t \xi^{p_f} (F_t)^{1-\alpha} \left( \frac{N_t}{\Delta_t^w} \right)^\alpha
\]  

(D21)

• **Aggregate employment:**

\[
N_t = \left( \frac{\alpha A_t \xi^{p_f}}{\mu_t \mu_t R_t} \right)^{-\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} F_t \Delta_t^w
\]  

(D22)
• Credit friction input (credit miss-allocation "input") $F_t$:

$$F_t = (1 - \delta_t) \left( \frac{(\omega)^k - (\tilde{\omega}_t)^k}{k(\omega - \omega)} \right) f_{t-1}^m$$

(D23)

• Credit market tightness:

$$\tau_t = \frac{f_t}{b_t}$$

(D24)

• Measure of firms in a credit relationship:

$$f_t^m = \varphi_t (\tilde{\omega}_t) f_{t-1}^m + p_t f_t$$

(D25)

• Measure of firms searching for credit:

$$f_t = 1 - (1 - \delta_t) f_{t-1}^m$$

(D26)

• Overall continuation rate for a credit contract:

$$\varphi_t (\tilde{\omega}_t) = (1 - \delta_t) \left( \frac{\omega - \tilde{\omega}_t}{\omega - \omega} \right)$$

(D27)

• Reservation productivity:

$$\left[ \alpha^\alpha (1 - \alpha)^{1-\alpha} A_t \xi^\omega \tilde{\omega}_t \right]^{1-\alpha} = (\mu_p^p w_t R_t)^{1-\alpha} \left[ x^f - \left( 1 - \eta p^f_t \right) \frac{\kappa}{p^f_t} \right]$$

(D28)

• Evolution of credit market tightness:

$$\frac{\kappa}{p^f_t} - E_t \Delta_{t,t+1} \varphi_{t+1} (\tilde{\omega}_{t+1}) \left( 1 - p^f_{t+1} \right) \frac{\kappa}{p^f_{t+1} p^b_{t+1}} = (1 - \eta) E_t \Delta_{t,t+1} \frac{1}{p^b_{t+1}} \left( 1 - \alpha \right) \frac{Y_{t+1}^f}{f_{t+1}^m} - \varphi_{t+1} (\tilde{\omega}_{t+1}) x^f$$

(D29)

• Stochastic discount factor:

$$\Delta_{t,t+1} = \beta \left( \frac{R_t}{R_{t+1}} \frac{C_t}{C_{t+1}} \right)$$

(D30)

• Matching rate for firms:

$$p_t^f = \mu \tau_t^{\nu-1}$$

(D31)

• Matching rate for banks:

$$p_t^b = \mu \tau_t^{\nu}$$

(D32)
• Gross real interest rate:
\[ 1 + r_t = \frac{R_t}{E_t\Pi_{t+1}} \] 
(D33)

• Credit destruction rate:
\[ cd_t = 1 - \varphi_t (\tilde{\omega}_t) - p^f_t \delta_t \] 
(D34)

• Credit creation rate:
\[ cc_t = \frac{m_t}{f^m_{t-1}} - p^f_t \delta_t \] 
(D35)

• Credit reallocation rate:
\[ cr_t = cc_t + cd_t \] 
(D36)

• Net credit growth rate:
\[ cg_t = cc_t - cd_t \] 
(D37)

• Labor share of GDP:
\[ LS_t = \frac{w_t N_t}{Y_f^t} \] 
(D38)

• Fixed cost of production share of GDP:
\[ FCS_t = \frac{\varphi_t (\tilde{\omega}_t) f^m_{t-1} x^f}{Y_f^t} \] 
(D39)

• Definition of aggregate loans as a fraction of deposits:
\[ \hat{l}_t = \frac{l}{d} \] 
(D40)

• Definition of aggregate excess reserves as a fraction of deposits:
\[ \hat{er}_t = \frac{er}{d} \] 
(D41)

9.3 The complete steady state

Given the calibration strategy defined in the main text, the steady state of the model can be written as the following two blocks of equations:

1. The recursive sub-system:
\[ \mu^p = \frac{\epsilon_p}{\epsilon_p - 1} \] 
(1)
\[ U = 1 - \frac{N}{L} \quad (2) \]

\[ 1 = \frac{\beta R}{\Pi} \quad (3) \]

\[ R = 1 + i \quad (4) \]

\[ 1 + r = 1 + i \quad (5) \]

\[ R \frac{\epsilon_w - 1}{\epsilon_w} = (1 - U)^{\eta} \quad (6) \]

\[ \hat{l} + \hat{r} + \hat{\xi}^{bs} = 1 \quad (7) \]

\[ \hat{l} = \varphi (\hat{\omega}) f^m \quad (8) \]

\[ \Delta = \beta \quad (9) \]

\[ FCS = \frac{\varphi (\hat{\omega}) f^m x f}{Y f} \quad (10) \]

\[ l = LS \quad (11) \]

\[ l = wN \quad (12) \]

\[ \hat{l} = \frac{l}{d} \quad (13) \]

\[ \hat{\xi}^{bs} = \frac{\xi^{bs}}{d} \quad (14) \]
\[ \bar{e}_r = \frac{e_r}{d} \]  
(15)

\[ C = Y^f \]  
(16)

\[ C = m - (1 + i) e_r \]  
(17)

\[ w = R C f (L) \bar{f} \]  
(18)

\[ w = w^* \]  
(20)

2. The simultaneous sub system:

\[ Y^f = Y^f - (b^n \kappa + \varphi (\tilde{\omega}) f^m x^f) \]  
(1)

\[ Y^I = A \xi^f (F)^{1-\alpha} N^\alpha \]  
(2)

\[ N = \left( \frac{\alpha A \xi^f}{\mu^w R} \right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} \]  
(3)

\[ F = (1 - \delta) \left( \frac{(\omega)^k - (\tilde{\omega})^k}{k (\omega - \tilde{\omega})} \right) f^m \]  
(4)

\[ T = \]  
(19)

\[ \tau = \frac{f}{b^u} \]  
(5)

\[ f^m = \frac{p^f f}{1 - \varphi (\tilde{\omega})} \]  
(6)
\[ f = 1 - (1 - \delta) f^m \] (7)

\[ \varphi (\tilde{\omega}) = (1 - \delta) \left( \frac{\overline{\omega} - \tilde{\omega}}{\overline{\omega} - \omega} \right) \] (8)

\[
\left[ \alpha^\alpha (1 - \alpha)^{1-\alpha} A \xi^{p_f \tilde{\omega}} \right] \frac{1}{\eta^{\nu}} = \left( \mu^{p_w R} \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta^{\nu}}} \left[ x^f - \left( \frac{1 - \eta p_f}{1 - \eta} \right) \frac{\kappa}{p_b^\nu} \right] \] (9)

\[
(1 - \beta \varphi (\tilde{\omega}) (1 - \eta p_f)) \frac{\kappa}{p_b^\nu} = (1 - \eta) \beta \left( (1 - \alpha) \frac{Y^f}{f^m} - \varphi (\tilde{\omega}) x^f \right) \] (10)

\[ p^f = \mu \tau^{\nu-1} \] (11)

\[ p^b = \mu \tau^\nu \] (12)

\[ cd = 1 - \varphi (\tilde{\omega}) - p^f \delta \] (13)

The recursive sub-system solve for the following variables and calibrated parameters:

\[ R, \Pi, \Pi^*, \Delta^p, \Delta^w, \mu^p, \varepsilon_w, L, \xi^{bs}, f^m, x^f, l, d, \varepsilon, \chi, C, i, r, m, \Delta, T, w, w^* \]

While the simultaneous sub-system solve for:

\[ \kappa, \mu, \xi^{p_f}, \delta, \alpha, Y^f, b^a, F, \tilde{\omega}, \tau, f, p^f, p^b \]

The simultaneous system of equations can be reduced as

- The reduced simultaneous system of equations is given by

\[
Y^f = (A \xi^{p_f}) \frac{1}{\eta^{\nu}} \left( \frac{\alpha}{\mu^{p_w R}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta^{\nu}}} (1 - \delta) \left( \frac{(\overline{\omega})^k - (\tilde{\omega})^k}{k (\overline{\omega} - \omega)} \right) f^m - \left( \frac{1 - (1 - \delta) f^m}{\tau} \right) \kappa + \varphi (\tilde{\omega}) f^m x^f \] (1)

\[
N = \left( \frac{A \xi^{p_f}}{\mu^{p_w R}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta^{\nu}}} (1 - \delta) \left( \frac{(\overline{\omega})^k - (\tilde{\omega})^k}{k (\overline{\omega} - \omega)} \right) f^m \] (2)
\[ f^m = \frac{\mu \tau^{\nu-1}}{1 - \varphi (\hat{\omega}) + (1 - \delta) \mu \tau^{\nu-1}} \] (3)

\[ \left[ \alpha^\alpha (1 - \alpha)^{1 - \alpha} A \xi^{pf} \tilde{\omega} \right]^{\frac{1}{1 - \alpha}} = \left( \mu^p w R \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{\mu^p w R}} \left[ x^f - \left( \frac{1 - \eta \mu \tau^{\nu-1}}{1 - \eta} \right) \frac{\kappa}{\mu \tau^{\nu}} \right] \] (4)

\[ (1 - \beta \varphi (\hat{\omega}) (1 - \eta \mu \tau^{\nu-1})) \frac{\kappa}{\mu \tau^{\nu}} = (1 - \eta) \beta \left( 1 - \alpha \right) \frac{\alpha}{\mu^p w R} \left( \mu^p w R \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{\mu^p w R}} (1 - \delta) \left( \frac{\omega^k - \bar{\omega}^k}{\kappa (\bar{\omega} - \omega)} \right) f^m - \varphi (\hat{\omega}) x^f \] (5)

\[ \varphi (\hat{\omega}) = (1 - \delta) \left( \frac{\bar{\omega} - \tilde{\omega}}{\bar{\omega} - \omega} \right) \] (6)

\[ cd = 1 - \varphi (\hat{\omega}) - \mu \tau^{\nu-1} \delta \] (7)

The above system of equations appear in the main text as equations SS4-SS8. Given our calibration strategy, the unknowns to be determined in the above system of equations are:

\[ \bar{\omega}, \tau, \delta, \alpha, \kappa, \xi^{pf}, \mu \]

10 Appendix D: A cashless economy with a Taylor Rule for Monetary Policy

Ideally, we would like to solve our model with a Taylor rule but at this point, we have regions of indeterminacy for sensible parameter values when we attempt it.\textsuperscript{23} We can solve the model with a Taylor rule in the case where the cash-in-advance constraint is removed as in a cashless economy. We set the Taylor rule coefficient on current inflation to 2, increase the persistence of the credit separation shock (financial shock) to 0.95. We present the impulse responses to a contractionary monetary shock, financial shock, and technology shock under a Taylor rule below. We find that the responses to a monetary shock are nearly identical under either the money growth rule or the Taylor rule. We find different responses when we consider a financial shock. We find the following differences: a much larger increase in unemployment and larger decrease in GDP and TFP. These are likely caused by significantly more credit tightness with a larger decrease in credit creation and increase in credit destruction. The inflation rate raises in the cashless economy while it falls in the cash in advance economy after a financial shock occurs. This result is explained by the different response of the price mark-up observed in each model. In both economies, the price mark-up is inversely related to the inflation rate but in the cashless economy, the price mark-up falls, producing a persistent raise in the inflation rate. Therefore, the central bank raises the interest rate following the Taylor rule. On the contrary, in the cash in advance economy, the inflation rate falls producing a persistent raise in real money balances.

\textsuperscript{23}Link to updated paper
and the consequent fall in the nominal interest rate. The latter occurs since nominal money balances growth at a constant and exogenous rate.

For this version of the model, we assume a cashless economy where firms need to secure funds for paying its wage bill in advance of production. For this, firms take loans from banks before attempting to produce but do not use those funds until production takes place and it is time to pay for labor at the end of the period. In other words, banks will place those funds in the firm’s account as a secured deposit. Then, the firm will be able to produce and hire workers. At the end of the period firms are able to use those funds to pay for labor services. Under these timing assumption, workers do not receive their payments in advance as in the benchmark model.

The household problem without the CIA constraint is given by

$$\max log C_t - \chi_t \int_0^1 \frac{N_t(i)^{\phi+1}}{1 + \phi} di$$

s.t

$$(1 + i_t^d) D_t + \Pi_t^b + \Pi_t^f - D_{t+1} + \int_0^1 W_t(i) N_t(i) di - P_tC_t$$

and the first order conditions are characterized by the following Euler equation:

$$\frac{1}{C_t} = \beta E_t \left\{ \frac{1}{C_{t+1}} (1 + r_{t+1}) \right\}$$

where

$$1 + r_{t+1} = \frac{1 + i_{t+1}}{\Pi_{t+1}}$$

In this setting, the marginal utility of consumption is the same as the marginal benefit of income (shadow price of income). On the other hand, the wage setting problem does not take into account the CIA constraint and the first order condition that characterizes the solution of this problem can be written in the same way as in the model that incorporates the CIA constraint with the only difference being that the multiplier that affects the first order condition is the marginal utility of consumption.

The model is closed assuming that the central bank follows a Taylor rule of the form:

$$R_t = (R_t)^{\phi_R} \left( \frac{1}{\beta} (\Pi_t)^{\phi_\pi} \left( \frac{Y_t}{Y_t} \right)^{\phi_Y} \right)^{(1-\phi_R)} \exp \left( \epsilon_t^i \right)$$

We calibrate the above monetary policy rule as $\phi_R = 0.8$, $\phi_\pi = 2$ and $\phi_Y = 0$.

In this case, since the marginal value of income (the shadow price of income) is the same as the marginal utility of consumption then aggregate labor supply does not depend on $R$ and it is defined to be
\[ w_t = C_t x_t (L_t) \bar{\gamma} \]

Finally, the consolidated budget constraint takes the form

\[ 0 = T_t + i_t c r_t \]

since we are assuming a cashless economy. Notice that in this case, excess reserves are related to fiscal policy funded by lump-sum taxation. The rest of the equations remain the same as before.

Figure 27: Model responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock under Taylor rule: panel 1

Figure 28: Model responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock under Taylor rule: panel 2
Figure 29: Model responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock under Taylor rule: panel 3

Figure 30: Model responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock under Taylor rule: panel 4
Figure 31: Model responses to a financial shock under Taylor rule: panel 1

Figure 32: Model responses to a financial shock under Taylor rule: panel 2
Figure 33: Model responses to a financial shock under Taylor rule: panel 3

Figure 34: Model responses to a financial shock under Taylor rule: panel 4
Figure 35: Model responses to a technology shock under Taylor rule: panel 1

Figure 36: Model responses to a technology shock under Taylor rule: panel 2
Figure 37: Model responses to a technology shock under Taylor rule: panel 3

Figure 38: Model responses to a technology shock under Taylor rule: panel 4
11 Appendix E: Introducing absconding and credit rationing into the loan contract

In this section we consider the possibility that borrowers may abscond with the funds obtained from banks. Following Becsi, Li, and Wang (2013) banks introduce an incentive compatibility constraint into the loan contract such that the value of the net surplus for an intermediate good producer in a credit contract is greater or equal to the value of absconding. We assume that in the case of absconding the firm is able to produce and generate profits but does not repay the bank. The bank is able to recover an exogenous fraction $\theta_t$ of the profits made by the intermediate good producer who is then barred from the loan market permanently. Therefore, if the producer decides to abscond, then it obtains $(1 - \theta_t)\left(\frac{u(\omega_{z,t}) - x_t}{\mu_t} - \tilde{l}_t(j, \omega_{z,t})\right)$ where $\tilde{l}_t(j, \omega_{z,t}) = w_t N_t(\omega_{z,t})$ denotes the loan extended by bank $j$ to producer $z$ in this new context. The optimal credit contract in this scenario is characterized by credit rationing. A bank will prefer to loan only a fraction $q_t(j, \omega_{z,t})$ of its deposits and leave the rest of its deposits as excess reserves at the central bank.

Banks’ balance sheet

Under the possibility that the borrower may abscond with the funds obtained from a loan, the balance sheet for bank $j$ is

$$\chi_t(j)\left(\tilde{l}_t(j, \omega_{z,t}) + \frac{ER_t(j)}{P_t}\right) + (1 - \chi_t(j))\frac{ER_t(j)}{P_t} = \frac{D_t(j)}{P_t}$$

(112)

such that if $\chi_t(j) = 1$ the bank extends a loan to an intermediate good producer characterized by $\omega_{z,t}$ and

$$\tilde{l}_t(j, \omega_{z,t}) = q_t(j, \omega_{z,t})\frac{D_t(j)}{P_t}$$

(113)

and

$$\frac{ER_t(j)}{P_t} = (1 - q_t(j, \omega_{z,t}))\frac{D_t(j)}{P_t}$$

(114)

with $q_t(j, \omega_{z,t}) \leq 1$. On the other hand, if $\chi_t(j) = 0$, the bank sets $\frac{ER_t(j)}{P_t} = \frac{D_t(j)}{P_t}$. Notice that if $q_t(j, \omega_{z,t}) = 1$ then we are back to the standard case since whenever $\chi_t(j) = 1$ then $l_t(j, \omega_{z,t}) = \frac{D_t(j)}{P_t}$ and $\frac{ER_t(j)}{P_t} = 0$.

The possibility of credit rationing means that if the bank extends a loan, then it will not use all its available funds, that is $\tilde{l}_t(j, \omega_{z,t}) \leq \frac{D_t(j)}{P_t}$. Under this circumstances, individual bank profits expressed in real terms are given by

$$\pi_t^b(j) = \chi_t(j) \left( R_t^l(j, \omega_{z,t}) \tilde{l}_t(j, \omega_{z,t}) + R_t^e \frac{ER_t(j)}{P_t} \right) + (1 - \chi_t(j)) \left( R_t^e \frac{ER_t(j)}{P_t} - \frac{\kappa}{\mu_t^e} \right) - R_t^d \frac{D_t(j)}{P_t}$$

(115)
Substituting out the term \((1 - \chi_t(j)) \frac{ER_t(j)}{\mu_t^e}\) from bank \(j\) balance sheet into \(\pi_t^b(j)\) yields

\[
\pi_t^b(j) = (R_t^e(j, \omega_{z,t}) - R_t^e) \chi_t(j) \tilde{t}_t(j, \omega_{z,t}) - (1 - \chi_t(j)) \frac{K}{\mu_t^e} + (R_t^e - R_t^d) \frac{D_t(j)}{P_t} \tag{116}
\]

As before, optimality with respect to deposits requires \((R_t^e - R_t^d) D_t(j) = 0\) every period. Since household deposits are always positive in equilibrium, the bank will choose to collect deposits until the gross interest rate on excess reserves is equal to the gross interest rate on deposits, that is \(R_t^e = R_t^d = R_t\). Substituting the optimality condition with respect to \(D_t(j)\) into the profit function yields the flow value of a bank

\[
\pi_t^b(j) = (R_t^e(j, \omega_{z,t}) - R_t) \chi_t(j) \tilde{t}_t(j, \omega_{z,t}) - (1 - \chi_t(j)) \frac{K}{\mu_t^e} \tag{117}
\]

Bank profits can be written as

\[
\pi_t^b(j) = \begin{cases} 
\pi_t^b(j, \omega_i) = (R_t^e(j, \omega_{z,t}) - R_t) \chi_t(j) \tilde{t}_t(j, \omega_{z,t}) & \text{if extends a loan to firm } \omega_z \\
- \frac{K}{\mu_t^e} & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases} \tag{118}
\]

The net surplus to a bank of being in an active credit contract is given by

\[
V_t^{BS}(\omega_{z,t}) = \pi_t^b(j, \omega_i) + \frac{K}{\mu_t^e P_t^e} \tag{119}
\]

where \(\frac{K}{\mu_t^e P_t^e}\) is equal to the continuation value due to free entry of banks. The surplus to a firm is

\[
V_t^{FS}(\omega_{z,t}) = \pi_t^f(\omega_{z,t}) + E_t \Delta_t, t+1 \left(1 - p_t^f\right) \psi_t(\tilde{\omega}_{t+1}) \int_{\tilde{\omega}_{t+1}} \frac{V_t^{FS}(\omega_{z,t+1})}{1 - \gamma_{t+1}} dG(\omega) \tag{120}
\]

where

\[
\pi_t^f(\omega_{z,t}) = \frac{y_t(\omega_{z,t}) - x_t^f}{\mu_t^p} - R_t^f(j, \omega_{z,t}) \tilde{t}_t(j, \omega_{z,t}) \tag{121}
\]

### 11.1 The loan contract

If the borrower has the possibility of absconding, the lender will modify the loan contract to ensure that absconding does not arise in equilibrium. The loan contract will be such that the borrower have incentives to abide the terms of the contract and repay the principal and interest rate to the lender at the end of the period. We assume the borrower is able to produce in the case of absconding, the contract must offer the household at least a fraction of the profits it obtains when not repaying to the bank. The loan contract solves the following Nash bargaining problem:

\[
\max_{\{R_t(j, \omega_{z,t}), \tilde{t}_t(j, \omega_{z,t})\}} (V_t^{FS}(\omega_{z,t}))^{\eta} (V_t^{BS}(\omega_{z,t}))^{1-\eta} \tag{122}
\]
subject to the following incentive compatibility constraint

\[ V_t^{FS}(\omega_{z,t}) \geq (1 - \theta_t) \left( \frac{y_t(\omega_{z,t}) - x^f_l}{\mu^t_l} - \bar{l}_t(j,\omega_{z,t}) \right) \]  

where

\[ \bar{l}_t(j,\omega_{z,t}) = q_t(j,\omega_{z,t}) \frac{D_t(j)}{P_t} \]

The first order condition with respect to \( R_t^l(j,\omega_{z,t}) \) yields the following sharing rule for the surplus generated in a credit relationship:

\[ (1 - \eta) \left( \frac{V_t^{FS}(\omega_{z,t})}{V_t^{BS}(\omega_{z,t})} \right)^{\eta} = \eta \left( \frac{V_t^{BS}(\omega_{z,t})}{V_t^{FS}(\omega_{z,t})} \right)^{1-\eta} + \lambda_t(\omega_{z,t}) \]  

where \( \lambda_t(\omega_{z,t}) \) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the incentive compatibility constraint. If the constraint is not binding, \( \lambda_t(\omega_{z,t}) = 0 \), we obtain the standard sharing rule for a Nash bargaining problem:

\[ (1 - \eta) V_t^{FS}(\omega_{z,t}) = \eta V_t^{BS}(\omega_{z,t}) \] as in the case with no possibility of absconding. Let \( MPL_t(\omega_{z,t}) \) denote the marginal product of labor, \( MPL_t(\omega_{z,t}) = \alpha A_t \omega_{z,t} N_t^*(\omega_{z,t})^{\alpha-1} \), and recall the loan extended by bank \( j \) is used by the intermediate producer to cover its labor costs \( \bar{l}_t(j,\omega_{z,t}) = w_t N_t^*(\omega_{z,t}) \). Then, the first order condition with respect to \( \bar{l}_t(j,\omega_{z,t}) \) implies:

\[
\eta \left( \frac{V_t^{BS}(\omega_{z,t})}{V_t^{FS}(\omega_{z,t})} \right)^{1-\eta} \left( \frac{MPL_t(\omega_{z,t})}{\mu^t_l w_t} - R_t^l(j,\omega_{z,t}) \right) + (1 - \eta) \left( \frac{V_t^{FS}(\omega_{z,t})}{V_t^{BS}(\omega_{z,t})} \right)^{\eta} \left( (R_t^l(j,\omega_{z,t}) - R_t) \right) \\
= \lambda_t(\omega_{z,t}) \left[ (1 - \theta_t) \left( \frac{MPL_t(\omega_{z,t})}{\mu^t_l w_t} - 1 \right) - \left( \frac{MPL_t(\omega_{z,t})}{\mu^t_l w_t} - R_t^l(j,\omega_{z,t}) \right) \right]
\]

Notice that the term \( \frac{MPL_t(\omega_{z,t})}{\mu^t_l w_t} - R_t^l(j,\omega_{z,t}) \) is the marginal profit for an intermediate producer that decide to finish the project and not abscond. By the same token, the term \( R_t^l(j,\omega_{z,t}) - R_t \) is the marginal benefit for a bank that extends a loan to a non absconding producer. Those two marginal profits are weighted by \( \eta \left( \frac{V_t^{BS}(\omega_{z,t})}{V_t^{FS}(\omega_{z,t})} \right)^{1-\eta} \) and \( (1 - \eta) \left( \frac{V_t^{FS}(\omega_{z,t})}{V_t^{BS}(\omega_{z,t})} \right)^{\eta} \). If the bank knows with certainty that the borrower will always pay back the loan, then \( \lambda_t(\omega_{z,t}) = 0 \) and the first order condition with respect to \( \bar{l}_t(j,\omega_{z,t}) \) would imply \( MPL_t(\omega_{z,t}) = \mu^t_l w_t R_t \). If the bank knows that there is a possibility that the borrower will abscond, the weighted average of marginal profits do not cancel out as in the standard case but are equal to the marginal opportunity cost of absconding which is given by the term \( (1 - \theta_t) \left( \frac{MPL_t(\omega_{z,t})}{\mu^t_l w_t} - 1 \right) - \left( \frac{MPL_t(\omega_{z,t})}{\mu^t_l w_t} - R_t^l(j,\omega_{z,t}) \right) \).

Combining the first order conditions yields an equation for \( \lambda_t(\omega_{z,t}) \) given by:

\[ \lambda_t(\omega_{z,t}) = (1 - \eta) \left( \frac{V_t^{FS}(\omega_{z,t})}{V_t^{BS}(\omega_{z,t})} \right)^{\eta} \left( \frac{MPL_t(\omega_{z,t})}{\mu^t_l w_t} - R_t \right) \left( \frac{MPL_t(\omega_{z,t})}{\mu^t_l w_t} - 1 \right) \]
Notice that since \( \lambda_t(\omega_{z,t}) \geq 0 \) then it must be the case that \( \frac{MPL_t(\omega_{z,t})}{\mu_t w_t} \geq R_t \) and \( \frac{MPL_t(\omega_{z,t})}{\mu_t w_t} \geq 1 \). If \( \frac{MPL_t(\omega_{z,t})}{\mu_t w_t} \leq R_t \) the firm and the bank are not willing to participate in the credit relationship. Substituting the solution for \( \lambda_t(\omega_{z,t}) \) into the sharing rule yields the optimal hiring condition for an intermediate good producer in a credit relationship:

\[
(1 - \eta) V_t^{FS}(\omega_{z,t}) \left( R_t - 1 - \theta_t \left( \frac{MPL_t(\omega_{z,t})}{\mu_t w_t} - 1 \right) \right) = \eta V_t^{BS}(\omega_{z,t}) (1 - \theta_t) \left( \frac{MPL_t(\omega_{z,t})}{\mu_t w_t} - 1 \right) \tag{127}
\]

The above equation clearly shows that when \( (1 - \eta) V_t^{FS}(\omega_{z,t}) = \eta V_t^{BS}(\omega_{z,t}) \) which is equivalent to having \( \lambda_t(\omega_{z,t}) = 0 \), the intermediate good producer will hire workers up to the point where \( MPL_t(\omega_{z,t}) = \mu_t^p w_t R_t \). When \( \lambda_t(\omega_{z,t}) > 0 \) then it must be the case that \( MPL_t(\omega_{z,t}) > \mu_t^p w_t R_t \) and the intermediate good producer will hire an inefficiently low number of workers due to the existence of equilibrium credit rationing. In order to focus on the implications of credit rationing, we assume that the incentive compatibility constraint is always binding, that is

\[
V_t^{FS}(\omega_{z,t}) = (1 - \theta_t) \left( \frac{y_t(\omega_{z,t}) - x_f}{\mu_t^p} - w_t N_t(\omega_{z,t}) \right) \tag{128}
\]

since \( V_t^{BS}(\omega_{z,t}) = \pi^b(t, \omega_t) + \frac{\kappa}{\mu_t^p} \) and \( \pi^b(t, \omega_t) = (R_t^l(j, \omega_{z,t}) - R_t) w_t N_t(j, \omega_{z,t}) \) then the ratio \( \frac{V_t^{FS}(\omega_{z,t})}{V_t^{BS}(\omega_{z,t})} \) is given by

\[
\frac{V_t^{FS}(\omega_{z,t})}{V_t^{BS}(\omega_{z,t})} = (1 - \theta_t) \left( \frac{y_t(\omega_{z,t}) - x_f}{\mu_t^p} - w_t N_t(\omega_{z,t}) \right) \frac{(R_t^l(j, \omega_{z,t}) - R_t) w_t N_t(j, \omega_{z,t}) + \frac{\kappa}{\mu_t^p p_t^b}}{(R_t^l(j, \omega_{z,t}) - R_t) w_t N_t(j, \omega_{z,t}) + \frac{\kappa}{\mu_t^p p_t^b}} \tag{129}
\]

substituting \( \frac{V_t^{FS}(\omega_{z,t})}{V_t^{BS}(\omega_{z,t})} \) into the optimal sharing rule yields the equilibrium loan interest rate equation:

\[
(R_t^l(j, \omega_{z,t}) - R_t) \tilde{t}_t(j, \omega_{z,t}) = \left( \frac{1 - \eta}{\eta} \right) \left( \frac{y_t(\omega_{z,t}) - x_f}{\mu_t^p} - w_t N_t(\omega_{z,t}) \right) \left( \frac{R_t - 1 - \theta_t \left( \frac{MPL_t(\omega_{z,t})}{\mu_t w_t} - 1 \right)}{\left( \frac{MPL_t(\omega_{z,t})}{\mu_t w_t} - 1 \right)} \right) - \frac{\kappa}{\mu_t^p p_t^b} \tag{130}
\]

The joint surplus of a credit relationship under the possibility of absconding is

\[
V_t^{JS}(\omega_{z,t}) = (1 - \theta_t) \left( \frac{y_t(\omega_{z,t}) - x_f}{\mu_t^p} - w_t N_t(\omega_{z,t}) \right) + (R_t^l(j, \omega_{z,t}) - R_t) w_t N_t(\omega_{z,t}) + \frac{\kappa}{\mu_t^p p_t^b} \tag{131}
\]

The optimal level of employment is obtained by maximizing the joint surplus of a credit relationship with respect to \( N_t(\omega_{z,t}) \):

\[
MPL_t(\omega_{z,t}) = \mu_t^p w_t + \frac{\mu_t^p w_t R_t}{1 - \theta_t} - \frac{\mu_t^p w_t R_t^l(j, \omega_{z,t})}{1 - \theta_t} \tag{132}
\]

and the cut-off productivity level solves \( V_t^{JS}(\omega_{z,t}) = 0 \) which implies:

\[
0 = (1 - \theta_t) \left( \frac{y_t(\omega_{z,t}) - x_f}{\mu_t^p} - w_t N_t(\omega_{z,t}) \right) + (R_t^l(j, \omega_{z,t}) - R_t) w_t N_t(\omega_{z,t}) + \frac{\kappa}{\mu_t^p p_t^b} \tag{133}
\]
This extension of the credit contract has several implications. First, the loan interest rate $R_l^j (j, \tilde{\omega}_{z,t})$ affects the joint surplus of a credit relationship and the cut-off $\tilde{\omega}_{z,t}$. This occurs only when the incentive compatibility constraint is binding since the net surplus that a borrower obtains from an active credit match has to be equal to its absconding value. By definition, the absconding value for an intermediate good producer does not take into account $R_l^j (j, \tilde{\omega}_{z,t})$ which implies that the joint surplus will depend on it. Under this assumption is more difficult to compute the optimal equilibrium values $y^*_t (\omega_{z,t})$, $N^*_t (\omega_{z,t})$ and $\tilde{l}_t (j, \omega_{z,t})$ since we need to solve a non linear system of equations.